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Privacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.
As one commentator has observed, privacy suffers from “an embarrassment
of meanings.” Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and
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lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the importance of “privacy” do not
fare well when pitted against more concretely stated countervailing interests.
In 1960, the famous torts scholar William Prosser attempted to make
sense of the landscape of privacy law by identifying four different interests.
But Prosser focused only on tort law, and the law of information privacy is
significantly more vast and complex, extending to Fourth Amendment law,
the constitutional right to information privacy, evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state statutes. Moreover,
Prosser wrote over 40 years ago, and new technologies have given rise to a
panoply of new privacy harms.
A new taxonomy to understand privacy violations is thus sorely needed.
This Article develops a taxonomy to identify privacy problems in a comprehensive and concrete manner. It endeavors to guide the law toward a more
coherent understanding of privacy and to serve as a framework for the future development of the field of privacy law.
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INTRODUCTION
In Jorge Luis Borges’s illuminating parable, Everything and Nothing, a
gifted playwright creates breathtaking works of literature, populated with an
unforgettable legion of characters, one after the other imbued with a unique,
unforgettable personality.1 Despite his spectacular feats of imagination, the
playwright lives a life of despair. He can dream up a multitude of characters—become them, think like them, understand the depths of their souls—
yet he himself has no core, no way to understand himself, no way to define
who he is. At the end of the parable, before he dies, the playwright communicates his despair to God:
“I who have been so many men in vain want to be one and myself.” The voice
of the Lord answered from a whirlwind: “Neither am I anyone; I have dreamt
the world as you dreamt your work, my Shakespeare, and among the forms in
my dream are you, who like myself are many and no one.”2

Privacy seems to be about everything, and therefore it appears to be
nothing. As one commentator observed:
It is apparent that the word “privacy” has proven to be a powerful rhetorical
battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts. . . . Like the emotive word “freedom,” “privacy” means so many different things to so many different people
3
that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might once have had.

Lillian BeVier writes: “Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to designate a wide range of wildly disparate interests—from confidentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy—and connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being asserted
in its name.”4 Other commentators have lamented that privacy is “vague
and evanescent,”5 “protean,”6 and suffering from “an embarrassment of
meanings.”7 “Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy,”
1

JORGE LUIS BORGES, Everything and Nothing, in LABYRINTHS 248 (Donald A. Yates
& James E. Irby eds., J.E.I. trans., 1964).
2
Id. at 249.
3
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.59 (2d ed.
2005).
4
Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 458
(1995) (footnote omitted).
5
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 25 (1971) (citation omitted).
6
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 234 (1977).
7
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 184-85 (1988).
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philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson has observed, “is that nobody seems to
have any very clear idea what it is.”8
Often, privacy problems are merely stated in knee-jerk form: “That violates my privacy!” When we contemplate an invasion of privacy–-such as
having our personal information gathered by companies in databases–-we
instinctively recoil. Many discussions of privacy appeal to people’s fears
and anxieties.9 What commentators often fail to do, however, is translate
those instincts into a reasoned, well-articulated account of why privacy
problems are harmful. When people claim that privacy should be protected,
it is unclear precisely what they mean. This lack of clarity creates a difficulty when making policy or resolving a case because lawmakers and
judges cannot easily articulate the privacy harm. The interests on the other
side-–free speech, efficient consumer transactions, and security-–are often
much more readily articulated. Courts and policymakers frequently struggle
in recognizing privacy interests, and when this occurs, cases are dismissed
or laws are not passed. The result is that privacy is not balanced against
countervailing interests.
Abstract incantations of “privacy” are not nuanced enough to capture
the problems involved. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, recommends that, as government agencies engage in greater information sharing
with each other and with businesses, they should “safeguard the privacy of
individuals about whom information is shared.”10 But what does safeguarding “privacy” mean? Without an understanding of what the privacy problems are, how can privacy be addressed in a meaningful way?
Many commentators have spoken of privacy as a unitary concept with a
uniform value, which is unvarying across different situations. In contrast, I
have argued that privacy violations involve a variety of types of harmful or
problematic activities.11 Consider the following examples of activities typically referred to as privacy violations:

8

Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIAN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
9
See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1154 (2004) (“[T]he typical privacy article rests its case precisely on an
appeal to its reader’s intuitions and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations.”).
10
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 394 (2004).
11
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]. In contrast to attempts to conceptualize privacy by
isolating one or more common “essential” or “core” characteristics, I concluded that there is
no singular essence found in all “privacy” violations. See id. at 1095-99 (concluding that “the
quest for a common denominator or essence . . . can sometimes lead to confusion”).
VACY:
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• A newspaper reports the name of a rape victim.12
• Reporters deceitfully gain entry to a person’s home and secretly photograph and record the person.13
• New X-ray devices can see through people’s clothing, amounting to
what some call a “virtual strip-search.”14
• The government uses a thermal sensor device to detect heat patterns in
a person’s home.15
• A company markets a list of five million elderly incontinent women.16
• Despite promising not to sell its members’ personal information to
others, a company does so anyway.17
These violations are clearly not the same. Despite the wide-ranging
body of law addressing privacy issues today, commentators often lament the
law’s inability to adequately protect privacy.18 Courts and policymakers frequently have a singular view of privacy in mind when they assess whether
or not an activity violates privacy. As a result, they either conflate distinct
privacy problems despite significant differences or fail to recognize a problem entirely. Privacy problems are frequently misconstrued or inconsistently recognized in the law. The concept of “privacy” is far too vague to
guide adjudication and lawmaking. How can privacy be addressed in a
manner that is non-reductive and contextual, yet simultaneously useful in
deciding cases and making sense of the multitude of privacy problems we
face?
In this Article, I provide a framework for how the legal system can
come to a better understanding of privacy. I aim to develop a taxonomy that
focuses more specifically on the different kinds of activities that impinge
upon privacy. I endeavor to shift focus away from the vague term “privacy”
12

See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).
See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971).
14
See Beyond X-ray Vision: Can Big Brother See Right Through Your Clothes?, DISCOVER, July 2002, at 24; Guy Gugliotta, Tech Companies See Market for Detection: Security
Techniques Offer New Precision, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2001, at A8.
15
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
16
See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,461, 82,467 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).
17
See In re GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 97-98 (1999).
18
See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208 (1992) (“The American legal
system does not contain a comprehensive set of privacy rights or principles that collectively
address the acquisition, storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal information
within the business community.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1999) (“At present, however, no successful standards, legal or
otherwise, exist for limiting the collection and utilization of personal data in cyberspace.”).
13
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and toward the specific activities that pose privacy problems. Although
various attempts at explicating the meaning of “privacy” have been made,
few have attempted to identify privacy problems in a comprehensive and
concrete manner.19 The most famous attempt was undertaken in 1960 by
the legendary torts scholar William Prosser. He discerned four types of
harmful activities redressed under the rubric of privacy:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or like20
ness.

Prosser’s great contribution was to synthesize the cases that emerged from
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s famous law review article, The Right
to Privacy.21
However, Prosser focused only on tort law. American privacy law is
significantly more vast and complex, extending beyond torts to the constitutional “right to privacy,” Fourth Amendment law, evidentiary privileges,
dozens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes.22

19

In 1967, Alan Westin identified four “basic states of individual privacy”: (1) solitude;
(2) intimacy; (3) anonymity; and (4) reserve (“the creation of a psychological barrier against
unwanted intrusion”). ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (1967). These categories focus mostly on spatial distance and separateness; they fail to capture the many different dimensions of informational privacy. In 1992, Ken Gormley surveyed the law of privacy.
See generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335. His
categories-–tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy, First Amendment privacy, fundamentaldecision privacy, and state constitutional privacy-–are based on different areas of law rather
than on a more systemic conceptual account of privacy. Id. at 1340. In 1998, Jerry Kang defined privacy as a union of three overlapping clusters of ideas: (1) physical space (“the extent
to which an individual’s territorial solitude is shielded from invasion by unwanted objects or
signals”); (2) choice (“an individual’s ability to make certain significant decisions without
interference”); and (3) flow of personal information (“an individual’s control over the processing—i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use—of personal information”). Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998). Kang’s
understanding of privacy is quite rich, but the breadth of the categories limits their usefulness
in law. The same is true of the three categories identified by philosopher Judith DeCew: (1)
“informational privacy”; (2) “accessibility privacy”; and (3) “expressive privacy.” JUDITH W.
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75-77
(1997).
20
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
21
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195-96 (1890).
22
See Anita L. Allen, Privacy in American Law, in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL
EVALUATIONS 19, 26 (Beate Rössler ed., 2004) (“American privacy law is impressive in its
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The Freedom of Information Act contains two exemptions to protect against
an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”23 Numerous state public records laws also contain privacy exemptions.24 Many state constitutions contain provisions explicitly providing for a right to privacy.25
Moreover, Prosser wrote over forty years ago, before the breathtaking rise
of the Information Age. New technologies have given rise to a panoply of
different privacy problems, and many of them do not readily fit into
Prosser’s four categories. Therefore, a new taxonomy to address privacy
violations for contemporary times is sorely needed.
The taxonomy I develop is an attempt to identify and understand the
different kinds of socially recognized privacy violations, one that hopefully
will enable courts and policymakers to better balance privacy against countervailing interests. The purpose of this taxonomy is to aid in the development of the law that addresses privacy. Although the primary focus will be
on the law, this taxonomy is not simply an attempt to catalog existing laws,
as was Prosser’s purpose. Rather, it is an attempt to understand various privacy harms and problems that have achieved a significant degree of social
recognition. I will frequently use the law as a source for determining what
privacy violations society recognizes. However, my aim is not simply to
take stock of where the law currently stands today, but to provide a useful
framework for its future development.
THE TAXONOMY
Privacy cannot be understood independently from society. As sociologist Barrington Moore aptly observes, “the need for privacy is a socially

quantity and scope.”). For a survey of the vast scope of the law of information privacy, see
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2003).
23
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000) (exempting “personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”);
id. § 552b(c)(7) (exempting disclosure of “investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes that “constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” at open meetings).
24
See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1160-64 (2002) (examining federal and state freedom of
information acts and their exemptions).
25
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to be
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”).
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created need. Without society there would be no need for privacy.”26 Society is fraught with conflict and friction. Individuals, institutions, and governments can all engage in activities that have problematic effects on the
lives of others.
Privacy is the relief from a range of kinds of social friction. It enables
people to engage in worthwhile activities in ways that they would otherwise
find difficult or impossible. Of course, privacy is not freedom from all
forms of social friction; rather, it is protection from a cluster of related activities that impinge upon people in related ways. This taxonomy attempts
to identify and organize these problematic activities.27 These activities often are not inherently problematic or harmful. If a person consents to most
of these activities, there is no privacy violation.28 Thus, if a couple invites
another to watch them have sex, this observation would not constitute a privacy violation. Without consent, however, it most often would.
Of course, declaring that an activity is harmful or problematic does not
automatically imply that there should be legal redress, since there may be
valid reasons why the law should not get involved or why countervailing
interests should prevail. As Anita Allen argues, there are certainly times
when people should be held accountable for their private activities.29 The
26

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY
73 (1984).
27
This taxonomy focuses on activities of others that can and do create privacy harms or
problems. The full equation for a privacy violation or problem is the existence of a certain
activity that causes harms or problems affecting a private matter or activity. This taxonomy
focuses on the first part of the equation (harmful or problematic activities) rather than on what
constitutes a private matter or activity. Since the question of which matters and activities are
private is too culturally variable and contextual, this taxonomy focuses on potentially harmful
or problematic activities, about which I believe meaningful generalizations can be made. Despite the fact that the taxonomy limits its focus to the activities that harm or cause problems
for private matters or activities, I believe that the taxonomy serves as a useful way for the law
to approach and comprehend privacy problems. While the entire “privacy equation” must be
worked out in each particular case, the taxonomy aims to carve up the landscape in a way that
the law can begin to comprehend and engage. All taxonomies are generalizations based upon
a particular focus, and they are valuable only insofar as they are useful. It is my hope that this
taxonomy succeeds by this metric.
28
Of course, there remains the issue of what constitutes valid consent, as there are many
occasions in which people affirmatively give out information that should not be assumed to be
consensual. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1397-98 (2000) (arguing that “people are demonstrably bad
at” assessing the risk of future harms that may flow from the piecemeal, otherwise consensual
collection of their private data); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1661-64 (1999) (discussing the
legal fiction of consent in the context of the Internet, specifically the use of boilerplate consent
forms that do not require user agreement before taking effect).
29
See ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING 2, 146 (2003) (discussing
tort theories available as recourse for the invasion of privacy in the context of sexual harassment claims).
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purpose of this taxonomy is not to argue that the law should or should not
protect against certain activities that affect privacy. Rather, the goal is simply to define the activities and explain why and how they can cause trouble.
The question of when and how the law should regulate can only be answered in each specific context in which the question arises. But attempts
to answer this question are increasingly suffering because of confusion
about defining the troublesome activities that fall under the rubric of privacy. This taxonomy will aid us in analyzing various privacy problems so
the law can better address them and balance them with opposing interests.
In devising a taxonomy, there are many different ways to go about carving up the landscape. I focus on the activities that invade privacy. The purpose of the taxonomy is to assist the legal system in grappling with the concept of privacy. Since the goal of the law is to have privacy protections that
best prevent and redress particular problems, we need to first understand the
problems in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the protections.
Therefore, my focus is on activities that create problems. I aim to show
that these activities differ significantly yet share many commonalities. Privacy is too complicated a concept to be boiled down to a single essence.
Attempts to find such an essence often end up being too broad and vague,
with little usefulness in addressing concrete issues. Elsewhere, I have argued that privacy is best understood as a family resemblance concept.30 As
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein explained, certain things may not share
one common characteristic, but they nevertheless are “related to one another in many different ways.”31 Wittgenstein analogized to members of a
family, who generally share some traits with each other (eye color, height,
facial structure, hair color, etc.), although they may not have one common
trait.32 There is, however, “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing.”33
The term “privacy” is an umbrella term, referring to a wide and disparate group of related things. The use of such a broad term is helpful in some
contexts yet quite unhelpful in others. Consider, for example, the term
“animal.” “Animal” refers to a large group of organisms—there are mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and so on. Within each of these groups are subgroups. For some purposes, using the term “animal” will suffice. Suppose
Sue asks Bob, “How many animals are in the zoo?” Bob does not need to
know anything more specific in order to answer this question. The use of
30

Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1096-99.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 65 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1968) (1958).
32
Id. § 67.
33
Id. § 66.
31
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the term “animal” in this sentence will be perfectly clear in most contexts.
Now suppose Sue wants Bob to bring her a dog. She will not get very far
by saying, “Bring me an animal.” Rather, she will specify the kind of animal she wants. Even saying “dog” probably will not be adequate, since Sue
probably wants a specific kind of dog. As with the term “animal,” there are
many times when using the general term “privacy” will work well. But
there are times where more specificity is required. Using the general term
“privacy” can result in the conflation of different kinds of problems and can
lead to understandings of the meaning of “privacy” that distract courts and
policymakers from addressing the issues before them.
The taxonomy demonstrates that there are connections between different harms and problems. It is no accident that various problems are referred
to as privacy violations; they bear substantial similarities to each other. But
we also must recognize where they diverge. The goal is to define more precisely what the problem is in each context—how it is unique, how it differs
from other problems, and how it is related to other types of privacy problems.
Often these problems involve harms to individuals. Certain kinds of
harm, such as physical injuries, are very easy to articulate and understand.
A privacy violation presents a more difficult case. Warren and Brandeis
spoke of privacy as an incorporeal rather than a physical injury. They noted
that the law was beginning to recognize nonphysical harms and that “modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon [a person’s] privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”34 Privacy, contended the authors, involves
“injury to the feelings.”35
The harms Warren and Brandeis spoke of are dignitary harms. The
classic example of such a harm is reputational injury. As Warren and
Brandeis noted, defamation law has long recognized and redressed this kind
of injury that lowered people in the esteem of others.36 But as Warren and
Brandeis understood, and as this taxonomy will demonstrate, there are other
kinds of dignitary harm beyond reputational injury. These are the harms of
incivility, lack of respect, or causing emotional angst. At the time Warren
and Brandeis wrote, they were concerned that such dignitary harms might
strike some as too ethereal to be legally cognizable.37 Their project aimed
to demonstrate that these were genuine harms that were legally cogniza34

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 196.
Id. at 197.
36
Id.
37
See id. at 198 (noting that traditionally, “our system . . . does not afford a remedy even
for mental suffering which results from mere contumely and insult”).
35

2006]

A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY

487

ble.38 And they succeeded, as Prosser emphatically demonstrated in 1960
by collecting hundreds of cases.39
There is another, more modern kind of privacy problem that does not
readily fit with this dignitary understanding of harm. These problems are
more structural in nature. I refer to them as “architectural” problems.40
They involve less the overt insult or reputational harm to a person and more
the creation of the risk that a person might be harmed in the future. They
are akin, in many ways, to environmental harms or pollution. In the taxonomy, two kinds of architectural issues emerge most often. First is the enhancement of the risk that a harm will occur. Activities involving a person’s information, for example, might create a greater risk of that person
being victimized by identity theft or fraud. Such risk-enhancing activities
increase the chances of the individual suffering dignitary harms as well as
monetary or physical harms. Second, a particular activity can upset the balance of social or institutional power in undesirable ways. A particular individual may not be harmed directly, but this balance of power can affect that
person’s life. The classic example is law enforcement officials having too
much power, which can alter the way people engage in their activities.
People’s behavior might be chilled, making them less likely to attend political rallies or criticize popular views. Surveillance can also have these effects. This kind of harm is often referred to as a “chilling effect.”41 Imbalances in power can also be risk enhancing, in that they increase the risk of
abuses of power.
When we speak of these activities, we often focus on how they affect an
individual’s life. This does not mean that privacy is an individualistic right.
Philosopher John Dewey astutely argued that individual rights need not be
justified as the immutable possessions of individuals; instead, they are instrumental in light of “the contribution they make to the welfare of the
community.”42 Employing a similar insight, several scholars contend that
privacy is “constitutive” of society. Constitutive privacy understands pri-

38

See id. at 197 (positing that a “legal remedy for [a privacy] injury” would treat the
“wound[ing of] feelings[] as a substantive cause of action”).
39
See Prosser, supra note 20, at 389 (examining over three hundred cases to find legal
recognition of “four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff”).
40
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 97-101 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON] (identifying
the influence of “an architecture that structures power, a regulatory framework that governs
how information is disseminated, collected and networked” on protecting privacy).
41
See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 1, 13 (1972) (confronting the alleged “chilling
effect” that Army surveillance had on “lawful and peaceful civilian political activity”).
42
JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Civil Liberties, in 11 LATER WORKS 372, 373 (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1987) (1936).
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vacy harms as extending beyond the “mental pain and distress” caused to
particular individuals; privacy harms affect the nature of society and impede
individual activities that contribute to the greater social good. Spiros
Simitis recognizes that “privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”43 Robert Post contends that the tort of invasion of privacy “safeguards rules of civility that in some significant measure constitute both
individuals and community.”44 The theory of constitutive privacy has been
further developed by Julie Cohen and Paul Schwartz, who both argue that
privacy is a constitutive element of a civil society.45
In the taxonomy that follows, there are four basic groups of harmful activities: (1) information collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4) invasion. Each of these groups consists of different related subgroups of harmful activities.
I have arranged these groups around a model that begins with the data
subject–-the individual whose life is most directly affected by the activities
classified in the taxonomy. From that individual, various entities (other
people, businesses, and the government) collect information. The collection
of this information itself can constitute a harmful activity. Not all information collection is harmful, but certain kinds of collection can be. Those that
collect the data (the “data holders”) then process it-–they store it, combine
it, manipulate it, search it, and use it. I label these activities as “information
processing.”46 The next step is “information dissemination,” in which the
data holders transfer the information to others or release the information.
The general progression from information collection to processing to dissemination is the data moving further away from the control of the individual. The last grouping of activities is “invasions,” which involve impinge-

43

Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707,
709 (1987). In analyzing the problems of federal legislative policymaking on privacy,
Priscilla Regan demonstrates the need for understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits.
See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, xiv (1995) (“[A]nalysis of congressional
policy making reveals that little attention was given to the possibility of a broader social importance of privacy.”).
44
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989).
45
See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1427-28 (“Informational privacy, in short, is a constitutive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of the term.”); Schwartz, supra note 18, at
1613 (“[I]nformation privacy is best conceived of as a constitutive element of civil society.”);
see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980) (“Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and encourages the moral
autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”).
46
I borrow the term “processing” from the European Union Data Protection Directive.
See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).

2006]

A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY

489

ments directly on the individual. Instead of the progression away from the
individual, invasions progress toward the individual and do not necessarily
involve information. The relationship between these different groupings is
depicted in Figure 1 below.47

47

I thank Peter Swire for suggesting and helping to develop this diagram.
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Figure 1

INFORMATION
PROCESSING
INFORMATION
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Surveillance
Interrogation

Aggregation
Identification
Insecurity
Secondary Use
Exclusion

DATA
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DATA
SUBJECT
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Intrusion
Decisional Interference

INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION
Breach of Confidentiality
Disclosure
Exposure
Increased Accessibility
Blackmail
Appropriation
Distortion

The first group of activities that affect privacy involves information collection. Surveillance is the watching, listening to, or recording of an individual’s activities. Interrogation consists of various forms of questioning or
probing for information.
A second group of activities involves the way information is stored,
manipulated, and used–-what I refer to collectively as “information processing.” Aggregation involves the combination of various pieces of data about
a person. Identification is linking information to particular individuals. Insecurity involves carelessness in protecting stored information from leaks
and improper access. Secondary use is the use of information collected for
one purpose for a different purpose without the data subject’s consent. Exclusion concerns the failure to allow the data subject to know about the data
that others have about her and participate in its handling and use. These activities do not involve the gathering of data, since it has already been collected. Instead, these activities involve the way data is maintained and used.
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The third group of activities involves the dissemination of information.
Breach of confidentiality is breaking a promise to keep a person’s information confidential. Disclosure involves the revelation of truthful information
about a person that impacts the way others judge her character. Exposure
involves revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions. Increased
accessibility is amplifying the accessibility of information. Blackmail is the
threat to disclose personal information. Appropriation involves the use of
the data subject’s identity to serve the aims and interests of another. Distortion consists of the dissemination of false or misleading information about
individuals. Information dissemination activities all involve the spreading
or transfer of personal data or the threat to do so.
The fourth and final group of activities involves invasions into people’s
private affairs. Invasion, unlike the other groupings, need not involve personal information (although in numerous instances, it does). Intrusion concerns invasive acts that disturb one’s tranquility or solitude. Decisional interference involves the government’s incursion into the data subject’s
decisions regarding her private affairs.
A. Information Collection
Information collection creates disruption based on the process of data
gathering. Even if no information is revealed publicly, information collection can create harm. I will identify two forms of information collection:
(1) surveillance and (2) interrogation.
1. Surveillance
For a long time, surveillance has been viewed as problematic. The term
“Peeping Tom” originates from a legend dating back to 1050. When Lady
Godiva rode naked on a horse in the city of Coventry to protest taxes, a
young man named Tom gawked at her, and he was punished by being
blinded.48 Today, many states have Peeping Tom laws. South Carolina, for
example, criminalizes “peep[ing] through windows, doors, or other like
places, on or about the premises of another, for the purpose of spying upon
or invading the privacy of the persons spied upon and any other conduct of a

48

CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION 36-38 (2000); Avishai Margalit, Privacy in the
Decent Society, 68 SOC. RES. 255, 259 (2001). In another version of the story, Tom is not
blinded by others, but inexplicably struck blind upon looking at her after Lady Godiva asked
the townspeople not to look. BBC, Beyond the Broadcast, Making History: Lady Godiva of
Coventry,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/education/beyond/factsheets/makhist/
makhist6_prog9d.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
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similar nature, that tends to invade the privacy of others.”49 Some states
prohibit two-way mirrors in certain areas.50
As with visual surveillance, audio surveillance has long been viewed as
troubling. William Blackstone noted that eavesdropping was a common law
crime, and defined it as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves of
a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and
mischievous tales.”51 These attitudes persisted after the emergence of electronic eavesdropping. As early as 1862, California prohibited the interception of telegraph communications.52 Soon after telephone wiretapping began in the 1890s, several states prohibited it, such as California in 1905.53
By 1928, over half the states had made wiretapping a crime.54 Justice
Holmes referred to wiretapping as a “dirty business,”55 and Justice Frankfurter called it “odious.”56 When the Supreme Court held in the 1928 case
Olmstead v. United States that the Fourth Amendment did not protect
against wiretapping,57 Congress responded six years later by making wiretapping a federal crime.58 In 1967, the Supreme Court changed its position
on wiretapping, overruling Olmstead in Katz v. United States.59 One year
later, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Title III of which provided comprehensive protection against wiretapping.60 Title III required law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before

49

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-470(A) (2003); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-61 (2003)
(criminalizing being a “peeping Tom” when “on or about the premises of another”); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (2004) (defining “Peeping Tom” and setting forth the penalty); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (Supp. 2004) (criminalizing peeping as a Class 1 misdemeanor); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-130 (2004) (criminalizing peeping or spying into a “dwelling or enclosure”).
50
For example, in California, “[a]ny person who installs or who maintains . . . any twoway mirror permitting observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower,
locker room, fitting room, motel room, or hotel room is guilty of a misdemeanor.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 653n (West 1988).
51
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169.
52
SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25-26 (1959).
53
Id. at 8, 25.
54
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 841 (2004) (citing Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967)).
55
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 758-59 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
57
277 U.S. at 466.
58
See Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2520, 48 Stat. 1103
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)).
59
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
60
Pub. L. No. 90-351, ch. 119, 82 Stat. 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522 (2000)).
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wiretapping and criminalized wiretaps by private parties.61 Congress
amended Title III in 1986 with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), expanding Title III’s protections from wiretapping to additional
forms of electronic surveillance.62
What is the harm if people or the government watch or listen to us?
Certainly, we all watch or listen, even when others may not want us to, and
we often do not view this as problematic. However, when done in a certain
manner—such as continuous monitoring—surveillance has problematic effects. For example, people expect to be looked at when they ride the bus or
subway, but persistent gawking can create feelings of anxiety and discomfort.
Not only can direct awareness of surveillance make a person feel extremely uncomfortable, but it can also cause that person to alter her behavior. Surveillance can lead to self-censorship and inhibition.63 Because of its
inhibitory effects, surveillance is a tool of social control, enhancing the
power of social norms, which work more effectively when people are being
observed by others in the community.64 John Gilliom observes: “Surveillance of human behavior is in place to control human behavior, whether by
limiting access to programs or institutions, monitoring and affecting behavior within those arenas, or otherwise enforcing rules and norms by observing and recording acts of compliance and deviance.”65 This aspect of surveillance does not automatically make it harmful, though, since social
control can be beneficial and every society must exercise a sizeable degree
of social control. For example, surveillance can serve as a deterrent to
crime. Many people desire the discipline and control surveillance can bring.
Jeff Rosen observes that Britain’s closed circuit television (CCTV)—a net-

61

82 Stat. 213-14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000)).
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2711, 3121-3127 (2000)) (expanding Titles I-III to protect “wire, oral, or electronic communications”).
63
See Kang, supra note 19, at 1193, 1260 (“Simply put, surveillance leads to selfcensorship.”); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 473 (1999) (“If I know I am under surveillance, I
might . . . restrict my activities, so that nothing embarrassing or otherwise harmful could be
detected.”).
64
As Judge Posner notes, “norms are more effective when people are under the observation of their peers.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 75 (1999); see also JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE 28
(1974) (finding both large-scale and less formal surveillance to be helpful to a government “or
any other agency seeking to obtain compliance from a mass clientele in a large-scale social
setting”).
65
JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 3 (2001).
62
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work of over four million public surveillance cameras—is widely perceived
as “a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful uncle
or aunt.”66
Too much social control, however, can adversely impact freedom, creativity, and self-development. According to Julie Cohen, “pervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices
toward the bland and the mainstream.”67 Monitoring constrains the “acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior,” and it results in “a subtle yet
fundamental shift in the content of our character, a blunting and blurring of
rough edges and sharp lines.”68 Surveillance thus “threatens not only to
chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to
dampen the force of our aspirations to it.”69 Similarly, Paul Schwartz argues that surveillance inhibits freedom of choice, impinging upon selfdetermination.70
In many instances, people are not directly aware that they are being observed. Does covert surveillance cause a problem? Under one view, surveillance is a prima facie wrong, whether overt or covert, for it demonstrates
a lack of respect for its subject as an autonomous person. Philosopher
Stanley Benn explains that overt surveillance does so by threatening its target’s “consciousness of pure freedom as subject, as originator and
chooser.”71 As Benn contends, “[f]inding oneself an object of scrutiny, as
the focus of another’s attention, brings one to a new consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another’s eyes.”72 Turning to covert observation, Benn explains that it “is objectionable because it deliberately deceives a person about his world, thwarting, for reasons that cannot be his
reasons, his attempts to make a rational choice.”73
Although concealed spying is certainly deceptive, Benn’s argument is
unconvincing. It is the awareness that one is being watched that affects
one’s freedom, and Benn fails to explain why covert surveillance has any
palpable effect on a person’s welfare or activities. A more compelling reason why covert surveillance is problematic is that it can have a chilling ef66

JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE 36 (2004).
67
Cohen, supra note 28, at 1426.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1656 (“[P]erfected surveillance of naked thought’s
digital expression short-circuits the individual’s own process of decisionmaking.”).
71
Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 1, 7 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 10.
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fect on behavior. In fact, there can be an even greater chilling effect when
people are generally aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never
sure if they are being watched at any particular moment. This phenomenon
is known as the Panoptic effect, based on Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 architectural design for a prison called the Panopticon.74 The prison was set up with
the inmates’ cells arrayed around a central observation tower. Most importantly, the guards could see each prisoner from the tower, but the prisoners
could not see the guards from their cells.75 In Michel Foucault’s words, the
cells were akin to “small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualized and constantly visible.”76 The prisoner’s “only rational option”
was to conform with the prison’s rules because, at any moment, it was possible that they were being watched.77 Thus, awareness of the possibility of
surveillance can be just as inhibitory as actual surveillance.
One might attempt to imagine surveillance so covert that its subjects are
completely unaware of even the possibility of being observed. While such
well-concealed surveillance might eliminate the potential for any discomfort
or chilling effect, it would still enable the watchers to gather a substantial
degree of information about people, creating an architectural problem.78
Surveillance is a sweeping form of investigatory power. It extends beyond a
search, for it records behavior, social interaction, and potentially everything
that a person says and does. Rather than targeting specific information, surveillance can ensnare a significant amount of data beyond any originally
sought. If watched long enough, a person might be caught in some form of
illegal or immoral activity, and this information could then be used to discredit or blackmail her. A prime example is the FBI’s extensive wiretapping
of Martin Luther King, Jr., widely believed to have been initiated in order to
expose King’s alleged communist ties. Though the surveillance failed to turn
up any evidence of such ties, it did reveal King’s extramarital affairs. The
FBI then attempted to blackmail King with the information, and FBI officials
leaked it in order to discredit King.79
The law addresses surveillance, but does so by focusing on where surveillance takes place rather than on its problematic effects. The law often
74

DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62-67

(1994).
75

Id. at 62-63.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books, 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
77
LYON, supra note 74, at 63.
78
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
79
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 185. For a more extensive account
of King’s experience with the FBI, see DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. (1981).
76
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recognizes surveillance as a harm in private places but rarely in public
places. In Fourth Amendment law, courts frequently conclude that surveillance in private places implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy
whereas surveillance in public places does not. In Kyllo v. United States,
the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant in order
to use a thermal-imaging device to detect heat patterns emanating from a
person’s home.80 The Court’s holding relied heavily on the fact that, though
conducted outside the petitioner’s home, the surveillance was capturing information about activities within it: “We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.”81
When surveillance occurs in a public place, however, the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Florida v. Riley,
the police flew over the defendant’s greenhouse in a helicopter at four hundred feet and peered down through a few missing roof panels to observe that
he was growing marijuana.82 The Court concluded that the defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy: “As a general proposition, the
police may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where [they
have] a right to be.”83 In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court held
that the government could not only fly over the petitioner’s property and observe it with the naked eye, but could also use a powerful aerial mapping
camera that enabled the identification of objects as small as one-half inch in
diameter.84
The contrast between the law’s approach to surveillance in private and
in public is most evident in a pair of Supreme Court cases involving location-tracking devices. In United States v. Karo, the Court concluded that a
tracking device that monitored a person’s movements within his home implicated that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.85 In contrast, in
United States v. Knotts, the police placed a tracking device in a can of chloroform, which the defendant then purchased and placed in his car.86 Using
the device, the police tracked the location of the defendant’s vehicle.87 According to the Court, the surveillance “amounted principally to the follow80

533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 144 (2002) (“Central to the Court’s reasoning was that the
thermal imager revealed information concerning activities inside the home.”).
82
488 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1989).
83
Id. at 449 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986).
85
468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
86
460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
87
Id.
81
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ing of an automobile on public streets and highways.”88 The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”89 Therefore, the
Court has concluded that while the Fourth Amendment protects against surveillance in private places such as one’s home, the Amendment has little
applicability to surveillance in public places.90 This understanding of privacy stems from what I call the “secrecy paradigm.”91 Under the secrecy
paradigm, privacy is tantamount to complete secrecy, and a privacy violation occurs when concealed data is revealed to others. If the information is
not previously hidden, then no privacy interest is implicated by the collection or dissemination of the information. In many areas of law, this narrow
view of privacy has limited the recognition of privacy violations.
Tort law is generally consistent with this approach. Courts have applied
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which protects against intrusion “upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns,”92 to
surveillance of private places. In Hamberger v. Eastman, for example, the
court concluded that a couple had a valid intrusion claim against their landlord for his installation of a hidden recording device in their bedroom.93 In
contrast, plaintiffs bringing claims involving surveillance in public have
generally not been successful.94

88

Id.
Id. at 281.
90
See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1349, 1357 (2004) (“[C]ontemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence differentiates
pervasive video surveillance from more familiar mass suspicionless searches in one crucial
respect: by holding that it is not a ‘search’ at all.”); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy:
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 233
(2002) (“Meaningful legal strictures on government use of public surveillance cameras in
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States are non-existent.”).
91
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 42-44.
92
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
93
206 A.2d 239, 241-42 (N.H. 1964); see also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413,
1431 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding media surveillance of a couple’s activities in their home to be
actionable under intrusion tort); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931) (holding
that wiretapping a person’s phone gives rise to a tort action because it violates his right “to the
privacy of his home as against the unwarranted invasion of others”).
94
See, e.g., Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding
that the defendant was not liable under intrusion tort for trespassing into a private club to engage in video surveillance of the plaintiff because the club was not a secluded place); Forster
v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 149-50 (Pa. 1963) (finding no intrusion liability when a private
investigator followed and filmed the plaintiff because the surveillance was conducted in public).
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In some cases, however, courts have recognized a harm in public surveillance. For example, in Nader v. General Motors Corp., Ralph Nader
charged that General Motors’s automobiles were unsafe.95 General Motors
undertook a massive investigation seeking information discrediting Nader.
Among other things, General Motors wiretapped his telephone and placed
him under extensive surveillance while in public.96 The court recognized
that certain kinds of public surveillance might amount to an invasion of privacy; although observation “in a public place does not amount to an invasion of . . . privacy,” in certain instances, “surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.”97 The court noted: “A person does not
automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public
place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the
right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing.”98 The
majority reasoned that extensive public surveillance can reveal hidden details that would not ordinarily be observed by others.99 The court’s analysis,
however, focused more on the harm of disclosure than on that of surveillance; pervasive surveillance could reveal details people ordinarily conceal,
and thus result in the discovery of secrets.100 The court did not recognize
the surveillance as a harm itself—only surveillance that destroyed secrecy
represented an actionable harm.101
Therefore, although the law often focuses on whether surveillance occurs in a public or private place, surveillance is harmful in all settings, not
just private ones.102 Surveillance in public can certainly cause uneasiness,
as illustrated by the example of being stared at continuously in public. As
Alan Westin observes: “Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that
men seek in open spaces and public arenas.”103 Moreover, public surveillance can have chilling effects that make people less likely to associate with
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225 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
Id.
97
Id. at 771.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 769.
100
Id. at 768-69.
101
Id. at 771 (“On the other hand, if the plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal that
fact to any casual observer, then, it may not be said that the appellant intruded into his private
sphere.”).
102
See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE RELATING TO TECHNOLOGICALLYASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE § 2-6.1(d) to (g) (Draft 3d ed. 1997) (recommending that
the law begin to address the harms of public surveillance).
103
WESTIN, supra note 19, at 31.
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certain groups, attend rallies, or speak at meetings.104 Espousing radical beliefs and doing unconventional things takes tremendous courage; the attentive gaze, especially the government’s, can make these acts seem all the
more daring and their potential risks all the more inhibitory. Thus, the dignitary harms and architectural problems of surveillance can occur both in
public and private places. The law, however, tends to focus more on secrecy than on the particular problems and harms caused by surveillance.
2. Interrogation
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”105 The Amendment
creates a “privilege against self-incrimination,” and it prevents the government from compelling individuals to testify against themselves.106 The
privilege has been justified as protecting against “[t]he essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own guilt,”107 as “a safeguard
of conscience and human dignity,”108 and as promoting “respect for personal integrity.”109
What is so inhumane about having to answer the government’s questions about one’s criminal acts? Why do we want to protect a potentially
guilty person from having to divulge her criminal activities?
A different, less coercive form of interrogation occurs when others or
the government ask questions for purposes other than criminal prosecution.
In the late nineteenth century, there was a loud public outcry when the U.S.
census began including more and more questions relating to personal affairs, such as marital status, literacy, property ownership, health, and finances.110 In the 1870s, an editorial in The New York Times, as well as editorials in other papers, decried the “inquisitorial” nature of the census.111 A
poem in The New York Sun in 1890 humorously criticized the census:

104

As Justice Douglas observed in another case: “Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly
kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 92-93 (1979) (emphasis
omitted).
107
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., dissenting).
108
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 445 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
109
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 488 (1968).
110
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1401 (2001).
111
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
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I am a census inquisitor.
I travel about from door to door,
From house to house, from store to store,
With pencil and paper and power galore.
I do as I like and ask what I please.
Down before me you must get on your knees;
So open your books, hand over your keys,
112
And tell me about your chronic disease.

Why was there such an outcry? When asked a probing question that
people find unwarranted, a frequent response is a snippy reply: “None of
your business!” Why do such questions evoke such a response? Why do
people take offense even at being asked certain questions—let alone being
compelled to answer them?
Understood broadly, these examples all involve a similar practice—
what I call “interrogation.” Interrogation is the pressuring of individuals to
divulge information. Interrogation has many benefits; it is useful for ferreting out information that others want to know.
However, interrogation can create harm. Part of this harm arises from
the degree of coerciveness involved. The Fifth Amendment privilege protects against highly coercive interrogation about matters with enormous personal stakes for the examined subject.113 However, for interrogation generally, the compulsion need not be direct; nor must it rise to the level of
outright coercion. Compulsion can consist of the fear of not getting a job or
of social opprobrium. People take offense when others ask an unduly probing question—even if there is no compulsion to answer. One explanation
may be that people still feel some degree of compulsion because not answering might create the impression that they have something to hide. This
is why, I believe, there are social norms against asking excessively probing
or prying questions: they make the person being questioned feel uncomfortable. Interrogation forces people to be concerned about how they will
explain themselves or how their refusal to answer will appear to others.
Interrogation resembles intrusion in its invasiveness, for interrogation is
a probing, a form of searching. Like disclosure, interrogation often involves
the divulging of concealed information; unlike disclosure, interrogation can
create discomfort even if the information is barely disseminated. To some
degree, surveillance resembles interrogation, for both involve the involuntary gathering of information. Interrogation, however, occurs with the conscious awareness of the subject; surveillance can be clandestine.

112

Id. at 63.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (explaining the Fifth
Amendment protections against self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation).
113
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Historically, interrogation has been employed to impinge upon freedom
of association and belief. During the McCarthy era in the 1950s, the House
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) employed interrogation to attack Communists and inhibit their association and expression of political
beliefs.114 Dissenting in Barenblatt v. United States, in which the Court upheld the Committee’s power to force a witness to answer questions about
Communist ties,115 Justices Black, Warren and Douglas argued that the interrogation’s harm did not affect the witness alone.116 They spoke of interrogation impeding “the interest of the people as a whole in being able to
join organizations, advocate causes and make political ‘mistakes’ without
later being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for
themselves.”117
Another aspect of the power of interrogation is its potential for resulting
in distortion. The interrogator possesses extraordinary control over what
information is elicited, how it is interpreted, and the impressions created by
its revelations. A skillful interrogator can orchestrate a dialogue that creates
impressions and inferences that she wants to elicit. In cross-examination, a
skilled attorney can carefully manipulate what a witness says and can intimidate a witness into coming across less favorably. Thus, one of the rationales justifying the privilege against self-incrimination is that it protects
accuracy.118 Even in the absence of deliberate manipulation, the interrogation process can be distorting. “The interrogat[ion],” observes Peter
Brooks, “seeks to pattern the unfolding narrative according to a preconceived story.”119 Interrogation can be distorting because information is elicited by another, often without an interest in learning the whole story. In
questionnaires and standardized forms, for example, distortion creeps in because the questions often do not ask for the entire story or are phrased in
certain ways that yield deceptive results.
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PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 40 (2000). The interrogation of Dimitri Karamazov in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov is an excellent literary example of how interrogation distorts the truth even
when the interrogators bear no deliberate motivation to distort. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG,
THE FAILURE OF THE WORD 55-58 (1984) (commenting on “Dostoevsk[y]’s belief that the
legal investigator, like the novelist himself, is motivated by an essentially personalized vision
of reality”).
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Beyond the Fifth Amendment, there are numerous legal protections
against interrogation. The First Amendment prevents government questioning about one’s political associations. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck down a law requiring public teachers to list
all organizations to which they belong or contribute.120 Later, in Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that a state may not ask questions
solely to gain information about a person’s political views or associations.121 According to the Court: “[W]hen a State attempts to make inquiries about a person’s beliefs or associations, its power is limited by the First
Amendment. Broad and sweeping state inquiries into these protected areas,
as Arizona has engaged in here, discourage citizens from exercising rights
protected by the Constitution.”122
Rape shield laws restrict the questioning of rape victims in court.123
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 limits certain employer inquiries about employee disabilities.124 Many states prohibit employers from
questioning employees or applicants about certain matters. For example,
Wisconsin forbids employers from requiring employees or applicants to undergo HIV testing.125 Massachusetts prohibits employers from asking about
arrests not leading to conviction, misdemeanor convictions, or any prior
commitment to mental health treatment facilities.126 Several states restrict
employers from requiring employees or applicants to undergo genetic testing.127 Evidentiary privileges protect communications between attorneys
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364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971). If the government has other purposes for asking such information, however, questions about political views and organizations are permissible. See Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1971) (remarking that questions about membership and intent to further a subversive organization’s
illegal aims were constitutionally proper); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-28
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Baird, 401 U.S. at 6.
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See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765-66 (1986) (discussing how rape
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and clients, priests and penitents, and doctors and patients.128 Privileges do
not guard against the questioning of the individual about her personal information; rather, they protect against the questioning of others about it. As
Catherine Ross contends, privileges protect against “forced betrayal.”129
Although the law protects against interrogation, it does so in a complicated and unsystematic way. The Fifth Amendment’s protection against interrogation is very limited. The Fifth Amendment certainly does not protect
the information itself; if the same facts can be produced at trial via other
witnesses or evidence, they are not prohibited. The Fifth Amendment is
therefore concerned only partly with the type of information involved-–its
applicability turns on compelled self-disclosure. However, as William
Stuntz observes, under current Fifth Amendment law:
As long as use immunity is granted, the government is free to compel even the
most damning and private disclosures. . . . If the privilege were sensibly designed to protect privacy, . . . its application would turn on the nature of the
disclosure the government wished to require, and yet settled fifth amendment
130
law focuses on the criminal consequences of disclosure.

Incriminating information may thus be compelled even under the Fifth
Amendment if there are no criminal consequences-–even if the compulsion
would cause a person great disgrace.131 In Ullmann v. United States, for example, a witness granted immunity to testify as to his activities in the Communist Party contended that he would not only suffer disgrace, but would
suffer severe social sanctions as a result, including losing his job and friends
, and being blacklisted from future employment.132 The Court rejected the
witness’s argument because no criminal sanctions would be imposed as a
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See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (2005) (privileging, in civil actions, any
patient communication to a physician or surgeon regarding “any physical or mental disease or
disorder or supposed physical or mental disease or disorder or as to any such knowledge obtained by personal examination of the patient”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1995) (“[T]he
client . . . has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer . . . .”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8803 (West 2005) (rendering privileged any “confession or admission” made to an accredited
practitioner of a religious denomination in her official capacity).
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Catherine J. Ross, Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: The ParentChild Privilege in Context, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85, 86 (2003).
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William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1234
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
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See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896) (“The design of the constitutional
privilege [against self-incrimination] is not to aid the witness in vindicating his character, but
to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal
charge.”).
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350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956).

504

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

result of his testifying.133 In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the “Fifth
Amendment was designed to protect the accused against infamy as well as
against prosecution,” and that the “curse of infamy” could be as damaging
as criminal punishment.134 Nevertheless, Douglas’s view has not been accepted in Fifth Amendment doctrine. It remains unclear what interests the
Fifth Amendment protects. As Stuntz observes: “It is probably fair to say
that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the privilege against
self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”135
Evidentiary privileges, like the Fifth Amendment, are also quite narrow
in scope. Despite strong public disapproval of forcing parents and children
to testify against each other, the majority of courts have rejected a parentchild privilege.136 Still, in the words of one court, “forcing a mother and father to reveal their child’s alleged misdeeds . . . is shocking to our sense of
decency, fairness and propriety.”137
Privacy law’s theory of interrogation is not only incoherent, it is nearly
nonexistent. Despite recognizing the harms and problems of interrogation-–
compulsion, divulgence of private information, and forced betrayal-–the law
only addresses them in limited situations.
B. Information Processing
Information processing refers to the use, storage, and manipulation of
data that has been collected. Information processing does not involve the
collection of data; rather, it concerns how already-collected data is handled.
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I will discuss five forms of information processing: (1) aggregation, (2)
identification, (3) insecurity, (4) secondary use, and (5) exclusion.
Processing involves various ways of connecting data together and linking it to the people to whom it pertains. Even though it can involve the
transmission of data, processing diverges from dissemination because the
data transfer does not involve the disclosure of the information to the public–-or even to another person. Rather, data is often transferred between
various record systems and consolidated with other data. Processing diverges from information collection because processing creates problems
through the consolidation and use of the information, not through the means
by which it is gathered.
1. Aggregation
The rising use of computers in the 1960s raised public concern about
privacy.138 Commentators devoted significant attention to the issue,139 and
privacy became an important topic on Congress’s agenda.140 Significant
concern was devoted to the data maintained by the federal government. In
1965, a group of academics led by professor Richard Ruggles criticized the
fact that the government’s data systems were decentralized and recommended consolidation.141 The Bureau of the Budget (now called the Office
of Management and Budget) supported the idea and suggested the creation
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REGAN, supra note 43, at 82.
See, e.g., MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 13 (1964) (discussing how life
in the 1960s brings with it some compulsory encroachments on privacy, but that “‘reasonable’
encroachments are fast becoming unreasonable . . . invasions . . . tending to make intrusion a
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See REGAN, supra note 43, at 82 (reporting that Congress held many hearings on the
issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
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SMITH, supra note 111, at 309.
139

506

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

of a Federal Data Center.142 The plan was quickly attacked in Congress and
scrapped.143 In 1974, the General Services Administration proposed the
creation of FEDNET, a plan to link together all computer systems maintained by the federal government.144 Vice President Ford immediately
halted the plan.145
What was the concern? The data was already in the record systems of
government agencies. Why was it a problem for the government to combine it into one gigantic database?
The problem is one that I have called “aggregation.”146 Aggregation is
the gathering together of information about a person. A piece of information here or there is not very telling. But when combined together, bits and
pieces of data begin to form a portrait of a person. The whole becomes
greater than the parts.147 This occurs because combining information creates synergies. When analyzed, aggregated information can reveal new
facts about a person that she did not expect would be known about her when
the original, isolated data was collected.
Aggregating information is certainly not a new activity. It was always
possible to combine various pieces of personal information, to put two and
two together to learn something new about a person. But aggregation’s
power and scope are different in the Information Age; the data gathered
about people is significantly more extensive, the process of combining it is
much easier, and the computer technologies to analyze it are more sophisticated and powerful.
Combining data and analyzing it certainly can be put to beneficial uses.
Amazon.com, for example, uses aggregated data about a person’s bookbuying history to recommend other books that the person might find of interest. Credit reporting allows creditors to assess people’s financial reputations in a world where first-hand experience of the financial condition and
trustworthiness of individuals is often lacking.148 These developments make
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sense in a world where there are billions of people and word-of-mouth is insufficient to assess reputation.
Alongside these benefits, however, aggregation can cause dignitary
harms because of how it unsettles expectations. People expect certain limits
on what is known about them and on what others will find out. Aggregation
upsets these expectations, because it involves the combination of data in
new, potentially unanticipated ways to reveal facts about a person that are
not readily known. People give out bits of information in different settings,
only revealing a small part of themselves in each context. Indeed, people
selectively spread around small pieces of data throughout most of their daily
activities, and they have the expectation that in each disclosure, they are revealing relatively little about themselves. When these pieces are consolidated together, however, the aggregator acquires much greater knowledge
about the person’s life.
Like surveillance, aggregation is a way to acquire information about
people. It reveals facts about data subjects in ways far beyond anything
they expected when they gave out the data. However, aggregation is a less
direct form of data acquisition than surveillance, for it occurs through processing data already gathered from individuals.
Aggregation can also lead to architectural problems; it can increase the
power that others have over individuals. The dossier created by aggregating
a person’s data is often used as a way to judge her. Aggregations of data,
such as credit reports, are used to evaluate data about a person’s financial
reputation and then make decisions that profoundly affect a person’s life,
including whether she gets a loan, a lease, or a mortgage. Elsewhere, I have
discussed the multitude of ways that the compilation of an individual’s
data–-what I call the “digital person”–-is being used to make important decisions about an individual. The digital person in digital space increasingly
is affecting the flesh-and-blood individual in realspace.149
Although making decisions based on aggregated data is efficient, it also
creates problems. Data compilations are often both telling and incomplete.
They reveal facets of our lives, but the data is often reductive and disconnected from the original context in which it was gathered. This leads to distortion. As H. Jeff Smith observes:
[D]ecisions that were formerly based on judgment and human factors are instead often decided according to prescribed formulas. In today’s world, this
response is often characterized by reliance on a rigid, unyielding process in

we have in one another’s truthfulness,” and that “[l]acking the personal information necessary
to discern the veracity of others’ claims, we trust instead the monitoring provided by large
social structures” and institutions such as credit bureaus).
149
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 1-10.
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which computerized information is given great weight. Facts that actually require substantial evaluation could instead be reduced to discrete entries in pre150
assigned categories.

Some courts have recognized aggregation as violating a privacy interest. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court concluded that the disclosure of
FBI “rap sheets” was an invasion of privacy within a privacy exemption of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).151 Pursuant to FOIA, “any person” may request “records” maintained by an executive agency.152 The rap
sheets contained extensive information about individuals compiled from a
variety of criminal records.153 FOIA exempts law enforcement records that
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”154 Although the reporters argued that the rap sheets were
not private because all of the information in them had already been disclosed, the Court disagreed, noting that in “an organized society, there are
few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another.”155 Thus,
the Court observed, there is a “distinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet
and revelation of the rap sheet as a whole.”156
Reporters Committee is one of the rare instances where the law has recognized that aggregation can make a material difference in what is known
about an individual. Most courts adhere to the secrecy paradigm, which
fails to recognize any privacy interest in information publicly available or
already disseminated to others.157 The Restatement of Torts declares that
for the tort of publicity given to private life, “[t]here is no liability when the
defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff
that is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts
about the plaintiff’s life that are matters of public record.”158 Similarly, the
Restatement provides that for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, “there is
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no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff.”159 In contrast, aggregation would violate a privacy interest when the
aggregation significantly increases what others know about a person, even if
originating from public sources.
Differing from Reporters Committee, courts have refused to find privacy
interests in compilations of information disclosed in Megan’s Laws, which
involve the dissemination of personal data about convicted sex-offenders.160
In Russell v. Gregoire, the court rejected a constitutional challenge to Washington’s Megan’s Law because the information was not private since it was
“already fully available to the public.”161 Similarly, in Paul P. v. Verniero,
the Court declined to follow Reporters Committee in concluding that New
Jersey’s Megan’s Law was constitutional.162 As one court observed: “Both
the Third Circuit and this Court have repeatedly stressed that Reporters
Committee is inapposite on the issue of those privacy interests entitled to protection under the United States Constitution.”163 These cases limited Reporters Committee to the FOIA context, but they did not supply a reason why recognizing a privacy interest in aggregated data is necessarily linked only to
FOIA and does not apply to other areas of law. Legally, the cases have drawn
a line, but conceptually, no justification has been offered for the limitation.
Of course, there are many reasons why Megan’s Laws might outweigh
privacy interests-–namely, as a means to promote safety of children, to keep
parents informed of which neighbors to avoid, and to help parents make sure
that the babysitter they hired is not a prior child molester. However, Russell 164 and Paul P.165 did not recognize a privacy interest in the aggregated
data, and thus no balancing took place between this privacy interest and the
safety interest.

159

Id. § 652B cmt. c.
See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 481 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
Reporters Committee was not applicable to a Megan’s Law challenge). But see Doe v. Poritz,
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2. Identification
Although proposed many times in the United States, a national identification card has been explicitly rejected. When the Social Security System
was first developed, “President Roosevelt and members of Congress promised that the Social Security card would be kept confidential and would not
be used for identification purposes.”166 The cards even stated that they were
“not for identification.”167 In 1973, the influential report, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, concluded:
We take the position that a standard universal identifier (SUI) should not be established in the United States now or in the foreseeable future. By our definition, the Social Security Number (SSN) cannot fully qualify as an SUI; it only
approximates one. However, there is an increasing tendency for the Social Se168
curity number to be used as if it were an SUI.

Why were there strong negative reactions to identification systems? What
is the problem with identifying people?
“Identification” is connecting information to individuals. According to
Roger Clarke, identification is “the association of data with a particular human being.”169 Identification enables us to attempt to verify identity–-that
the person accessing her records is indeed the owner of the account or the
subject of the records. Identification enables us not only to confirm the
identity of a person, but also to discover the perpetrator of a crime from
traces left behind, such as fingerprints and genetic material.170
Identification is related to disclosure in that both involve the revelation
of true information. Identification involves a particular form of true information (one’s identity), which enables databases of information to be linked
to people. Identification is similar to aggregation as both involve the combination of different pieces of information, one being the identity of a person. However, identification differs from aggregation in that it entails a link
166
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Clarke observes: “In the context of information systems, the purpose of identification is more
concrete: it is used to link a stream of data with a person.” Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues, 7 INFO.
&
PEOPLE
6,
8
(1994),
available
at
http://www.anu.edu.au/
TECH.
people/Roger.Clarke/DV/HumanID.html [hereinafter Clarke, Information Systems].
170
For a history of criminal identification techniques, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 4-5 (2001).

2006]

A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY

511

to the person in the flesh. For example, there can be extensive aggregations
of data about a person in many databases, but these aggregations might be
rarely connected to that person as she goes through her day-to-day activities.
This is a situation involving high aggregation and low identification. On the
flip side, one can have high identification and low aggregation, such as in a
world of checkpoints, where people constantly have to show identification
but where there are few linkages to larger repositories of data about people.
Identification has many benefits.171 In order to access various accounts,
people’s identity must be verified, a step that can reduce fraud and enhance
accountability. Identification can deter misleading political campaign ads.
Under federal election law, television ads advocating the election or defeat
of a candidate must identify the person or group placing the ad.172 If an ad
is not authorized by a candidate, it “shall clearly state the name and permanent street address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address of the
person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is
not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.”173 Identification requirements such as this one can help prevent misinformation and enable people to better assess the ad.
Although identification of people or sources of particular messages can
be beneficial, it also creates problems. There are some who argue that identification is demeaning to dignity because it reduces people to a number or
to bodily characteristics.174 But, identification is a means to link people to
data, not necessarily an indication that people are the equivalent of their
identifying characteristics. One need not assume that identification equates
individual identity with the identifiers. Therefore, I do not agree that identification is inherently demeaning to dignity.
There is, nonetheless, a more compelling argument for why identification can negatively impact identity. The problem stems not from the identifier itself but from how it links data to individuals. Because it connects
people to data, identification attaches informational baggage to people. This
171
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alters what others learn about people as they engage in various transactions
and activities. An interesting example of this was a case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which enforces the Council of
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.175 In B. v. France, a French citizen who had surgically changed
her sex from male to female sought to have her identification documents
(birth certificate, identity card, passport, and voting card) changed from listing her former male name to a female one.176 Since gender was “indicated
on all documents using the identification number issued to everyone” and
since this “number was used as part of the system of dealings between social security institutions, employers and those insured,” it prevented her
from concealing the fact she was a transsexual and effectively assuming a
female identity.177 As the Commission stated:
A transsexual was consequently unable to hide his or her situation from a potential employer and the employer’s administrative staff; the same applied to
the many occasions in daily life where it was necessary to prove the existence
and amount of one’s income (taking a lease, opening a bank account, applying
for credit, etc.). This led to difficulties for the social and professional integra178
tion of transsexuals.

The Commission concluded that the applicant, “as a result of the frequent necessity of disclosing information concerning her private life to third
parties, suffered distress which was too serious to be justified on the ground
of respect for the rights of others.”179 This case illustrates how identification can inhibit people’s ability to change and can prevent their selfdevelopment by tying them to a past from which they want to escape.180
In some ways, identification resembles interrogation, as identification
often involves the questioning of individuals to compel them to identify
themselves. Identification is a component of certain forms of surveillance
insofar as it facilitates the detection and monitoring of a person and enables
surveillance data to be categorized according to the individuals to which it
pertains.
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Article 8 of the Convention provides for the protection of “the right to respect for [an
individual’s] private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221.
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232 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33, 36 (1992).
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Id. at 52.
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Id.
179
Id.
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The science fiction movie Gattaca also illustrates these points. Vincent, the protagonist, is linked to his high risk of developing heart problems, thus rendering him unfit for all
but the most menial of jobs. GATTACA (Columbia Pictures 1997).
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Identification is thus interrelated with other forms of privacy disruption,
and, like those forms, it reveals, distorts, and intrudes. Identification diverges, however, because it is primarily a form of connecting data to people.
Aggregation creates what I have called a “digital person,” a portrait composed of information fragments combined together.181 Identification goes a
step further–-it links the digital person directly to a person in realspace.
Some forms of identification can have similar effects to disclosure. For
example, expressive methods of identification, such as branding, tattooing,
or scarlet letters have been used “usually in the context of slavery, racial
subjugation or harsh criminal systems.”182 The identification marker conveys certain information and often bears a particular stigma. In contrast,
nonexpressive means of identification, such as fingerprints, identify people
without signaling anything to the public.
Identification also creates architectural problems, for it increases the
government’s power over individuals. Identification has been a critical tool
for governments seeking to round up radicals or disfavored citizens.183 It is
also an efficient tool for controlling people. In the United States, passports
were used to stifle dissent; since Communists during the McCarthy era were
prohibited from using passports, they were restricted from traveling outside
the country.184
Identification can inhibit one’s ability to be anonymous or pseudonymous.185 Anonymity and pseudonymity protect people from bias based on
their identities and enable people to vote, speak, and associate more freely
by protecting them from the danger of reprisal.186 Anonymity can enhance
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SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 1.
Clarke, Information Systems, supra note 169, at 20.
183
As Richard Sobel observes, “[i]dentity systems and documents have a long history of
uses and abuses for social control and discrimination.” Richard Sobel, The Degradation of
Political Identity Under a National Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 48
(2002). Indeed, one of the primary reasons that governments created passports and identity
cards was to restrict movement, alter patterns of migration, and control the movements of poor
people and others viewed as undesirable. Marc Garcelon, Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY
83, 86 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001).
184
Sobel, supra note 183, at 49.
185
Anonymous speech has a long history as an important mode of expression. Between
1789 and 1809, numerous Presidents and Congressmen published anonymous political writings. SMITH, supra note 111, at 41. Ben Franklin used over forty pen names during his life.
Id. at 43. Indeed, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay published the Federalist
Papers using the pseudonym “Publius.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
343 n.6 (1995). The Anti-Federalists also used pseudonyms. Id.
186
As Gary Marx notes, anonymity can “facilitate the flow of information and communication on public issues” and “encourage experimentation and risk taking without facing
large consequences, risk of failure, or embarrassment since one’s identity is protected.” Gary
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the persuasiveness of one’s ideas, for identification can shade reception of
ideas with readers’ biases and prejudices. This is why, in many universities
and schools, exams are graded anonymously. Anonymity provides people
with the ability to criticize the companies they work for and to blow the
whistle.187 Anonymity also protects people who read or listen to certain unpopular ideas.188
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public
matters of importance.”189 Thus, requiring the disclosure of identifying information would chill free speech, violating the First Amendment. However, in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, the Court concluded that a
law requiring people to identify themselves during a police stop did not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.190 In particular, responding to the
Fifth Amendment challenge, the Court concluded: “Answering a request to
disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”191 However, as Justice
Stevens wrote in dissent:
A name can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person,
particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases. And that information, in turn, can be tremendously useful
in a criminal prosecution. It is therefore quite wrong to suggest that a person’s
identity provides a link in the chain to incriminating evidence “only in unusual
192
circumstances.”

T. Marx, Identity and Anonymity: Some Conceptual Distinctions and Issues for Research, in
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, supra note 183, at 311, 316, 318 (2001); see also A.
Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital
Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 408 (1996) (“Not everyone is so courageous as to wish to be known for everything they say, and some timorous speech deserves
encouragement.”).
187
One of the most famous examples of an anonymous whistleblower is Deep Throat,
Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s confidential source who helped them unearth the Watergate scandal. See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 71-73,
130-35 (1974).
188
See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1012-14 (1996) (arguing that reader
anonymity is an important First Amendment value and that anonymous reading protects people from being associated with the ideas about which they read).
189
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc.
v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002) (stating that anonymity protects people
who engage in “unpopular causes”); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42 (“The decision in favor of
anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”).
190
542 U.S. 177, 189, 190-91 (2004).
191
Id. at 191.
192
Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 191 (majority opinion)).
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Stevens’s dissent recognizes that the harm of identification is often not in
the disclosure of the identifying marker (the name, fingerprint, etc.) itself,
but in the ability to connect this marker to a stream of collected data. Being
asked to identify oneself, therefore, is being asked to link oneself to the
data, not just state a name.
3. Insecurity
Identity theft is the fastest growing white collar crime.193 An identity
thief opens accounts and conducts fraud in the victim’s name. As I have argued elsewhere, identity theft is made possible because we all have “digital
dossiers”—extensive repositories of personal information about us—that are
maintained by various companies and institutions.194 The thief taps into a
person’s dossier, which becomes polluted with discrediting information
when debts go unpaid, or when the thief uses the person’s identity to commit a crime. Victims of identity theft are submerged into a bureaucratic hell
where, according to one estimate, they must spend approximately two years
and almost 200 hours to decontaminate their dossier.195 While their dossier
remains defiled, victims have difficulty getting jobs, loans, or mortgages.196
Identity theft is the overt result of a larger group of problems I call “insecurity.” Glitches, security lapses, abuses, and illicit uses of personal information all fall into this category. Insecurity, in short, is a problem caused
by the way our information is handled and protected.
Insecurity is related to aggregation, as it creates risks of downstream
harm that can emerge from inadequate protection of compendiums of personal data. Insecurity is also related to identification—it often occurs because of difficulties in linking data to people. As Lynn LoPucki observes,
identity theft occurs because “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often
lack both the means and the incentives to correctly identify the persons who
seek credit from them or on whom they report.”197 In this sense, insecurity
can be a cost of lack of identification.198
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Jennifer 8. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
8, 2001, § 3, at 8.
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SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 110.
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JANINE BENNER ET AL., NOWHERE TO TURN: VICTIMS SPEAK OUT ON IDENTITY
THEFT, pt. II, §§ 1, 4 (2000), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm.
196
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 110.
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Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80
TEX. L. REV. 89, 94 (2001).
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Identification via password, however, can enhance security without linking the individual up to immutable characteristics such as biometric identifiers.

516

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

Distortion—the dissemination of false information about a person—is
related to insecurity, since problems with security can result in one’s records
being polluted with false data. This can destroy a person’s financial reputation, which today is based in large part on the records maintained by credit
reporting agencies.199 Insecurity, therefore, can involve not only a threat of
disclosure, but also a threat of distortion.
Insecurity exposes people to potential future harm. Combating identity
theft after it happens has proven immensely difficult.200 The careless use of
data by businesses and the government makes the crime of identity theft incredibly easy. Companies use Social Security numbers (SSNs) as passwords, and since SSNs can be readily obtained by identity thieves from public records or from database companies, people’s accounts and personal
information are insecure.201
In cases involving the constitutional right to privacy, courts have sometimes recognized insecurity as a privacy harm. In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court suggested that the constitutional right to privacy also extended
to the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”202 As
the Court observed, the government’s collection of personal data for its record systems “is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”203 The Court noted that “in
some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”204
Applying Whalen, a federal circuit court in Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia concluded that certain questions on a
police department employee questionnaire were unconstitutional because
there were no guidelines about maintaining the security of the information.205
Many privacy statutes require that information be kept secure. This requirement was proposed in the original Fair Information Practices of 1973:
“Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the
199

See NOCK, supra note 148, at 53 (recounting the rise of credit bureaus). For a comprehensive account of the credit reporting system, see EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES &
CREDIT REPORTS (2004).
200
See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 111-12 (noting that investigation and prosecution of identity theft cases is not a top priority for law enforcement agencies,
and that victims are slow to realize that their identity has been stolen).
201
Id. at 115-19.
202
429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
203
Id. at 605.
204
Id.
205
812 F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987).
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data.”206 The Privacy Act of 1974 requires federal agencies maintaining
personal data to “establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of records.”207 The
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act states that websites must protect
the “confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected
from children.”208 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires that regulatory
agencies of financial institutions establish security standards for personal
information.209 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 requires the promulgation of security standards “to ensure the integrity
and confidentiality of [medical] information.”210 The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act prohibits hacking into people’s computers.211
Although the law recognizes injuries when a breach in security results
in overt harm to an individual, courts are reluctant to find harm simply from
the insecure storage of information.212 Several privacy statutes attempt to
avoid problems in measuring harm by providing for minimum liquidated
damages.213 In many instances, courts ignore insecurity as a problem. For
example, in Board of Education v. Earls, a school district in Tecumseh,
Oklahoma adopted a drug testing policy that required all middle and high
school students to undergo drug testing before participating in any extracurricular activity.214 Some of the students challenged the policy under the
Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court upheld the testing.215 The students contended that the school was careless in protecting the security of the
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U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 41.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2000).
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15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(D) (2000).
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15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2000). For the FTC’s security regulations, see 16
C.F.R. § 314 (2005).
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42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2) (2000).
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18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
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See Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 11-12 (Margaret Jane Radin et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=583483 (arguing that the law fails to
adequately guard sensitive information, and that a reconceptualization of the legal duties information-keepers owe their customers is necessary).
213
See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c)
(2000) (setting a minimum $1000 fine per violation); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,
18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2000) (setting liquidated damages of $2500 as the minimum amount recoverable from a defendant found to have wrongfully disclosed video tape rental or sale records). The Privacy Act of 1974 also contains a liquidated damages provision; however, the
Supreme Court interpreted it to apply only when the plaintiff demonstrates actual damages.
See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616 (2004) (construing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000)).
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536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002).
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test results.216 Files were not carefully secured and were left where they
could be accessed by unauthorized people, such as other students.217 The
Court dismissed this contention because there were no allegations of any
improper disclosures.218 What the court failed to recognize is that disclosure differs from insecurity because the harm caused by disclosure is the actual leakage of information; insecurity is the injury of being placed in a
weakened state, of being made more vulnerable to a range of future harms.
Although insecurity increases the possibility of disclosure, courts will often
not recognize a harm unless there has been actual disclosure.
4. Secondary Use
In 1977, in an attempt to capture people engaged in fraud, the federal
government began matching its employee records with the records of individuals receiving federal benefits.219 Some of these government matching
programs used information obtained from businesses to uncover fraud.220
These matchings were done electronically through the use of computers,
and they led to the investigations of millions of people.221 In 1988, Congress passed the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act to regulate
computer matching.222
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) in its influential report on the harms caused by computer databases,
set forth a series of Fair Information Practices, one of which provides that
“[t]here must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent.”223 This principle, which has become known as
the purpose specification principle, has been embodied in various privacy
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Id. at 833.
Id. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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See id. at 833 (majority opinion) (asserting that because there was no report of a student actually viewing another student’s medical record, the carelessness alleged did not rise to
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REGAN, supra note 43, at 86; Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 198-99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
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See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 209-10
(1988) (citing instances of government agencies—including the Selective Service and the
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and tax fraud).
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principles and laws. The Privacy Act of 1974, for example, requires agencies to inform people of “the principal purpose or purposes for which the
information is intended to be used” when their information is collected.224
The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 limits the purposes for which credit
reports can be used.225 The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 makes
it “unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted [by the
Act].”226 Anybody who uses an individual’s personal data obtained from a
motor vehicle record for an impermissible purpose is subject to civil liability.227 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 requires cable operators to “destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.”228 The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 places limits on the “reuse” of personal
data when a company provides it to another company.229 The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 has a similar provision for personal information
collected about video rental customers.230 The Federal Election Campaign
Act states that records of contributors to political committees are “available
for public inspection . . . except that any information copied from such reports . . . may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of soliciting
contributions or for commercial purposes.”231 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act regulations restrict secondary uses of medical
information beyond those necessary for treatment, payment, and health care
operations.232
What is the concern over secondary uses of information beyond those
purposes for which it is collected? Why are there so many legal attempts to
limit secondary uses of data?
“Secondary use” is the use of data for purposes unrelated to the purposes for which the data was initially collected without the data subject’s
consent. There are certainly many desirable instances of secondary use. Information might be used to stop a crime or to save a life. The variety of
possible secondary uses of data is virtually infinite, and they range from benign to malignant.

224
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Secondary use can cause problems. It creates a dignitary harm, as it involves using information in ways to which a person does not consent and
might not find desirable. Secondary uses thwart people’s expectations
about how the data they give out will be used. People might not give out
data if they know about a potential secondary use, such as for telemarketing,
spam, or other forms of intrusive advertising. Fingerprints of United States
military recruits originally collected to screen their backgrounds were sent
to the FBI and incorporated into the FBI’s criminal fingerprint database.233
Such individuals may not have expected nor desired to have their fingerprints maintained in a law enforcement database of convicts and criminals.
Secondary use resembles breach of confidentiality, in that there is a betrayal
of the person’s expectations when giving out information.
One argument to the contrary is that people should simply expect that
their data might be used in different ways when they relinquish it. Under
this theory, there is no harm to expectations. But even with privacy policies
stating that information might be used in secondary ways, people often do
not read or understand these policies. Nor can they appropriately make an
informed decision about secondary uses since they might have little idea
about the range of potential uses. According to Paul Schwartz, this is an
asymmetry of knowledge problem:
[I]ndividuals are likely to know little or nothing about the circumstances under
which their personal data are captured, sold, or processed. This widespread
individual ignorance hinders development through the privacy marketplace of
appropriate norms about personal data use. The result of this asymmetrical
234
knowledge will be one-sided bargains that benefit data processors.

The potential for secondary use generates fear and uncertainty over how
one’s information will be used in the future, creating a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability. In this respect, secondary use resembles the harm
created by insecurity. The harm is a dignitary one, emerging from denying
people control over the future use of their data, which can be used in ways
that have significant effects on their lives.
Secondary use also creates architectural problems. The secondary use
of information can create problems because the information may not fit as
well with the new use. When removed from the original context in which it
was collected, data can more readily be misunderstood.
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5. Exclusion
Among the Fair Information Practices are three related principles: (1)
the existence of record systems cannot be kept secret; (2) an individual must
be able to “find out what information about him is in a record and how it is
used”; and (3) an individual must be able to “correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.”235 Together these principles aim to allow individuals to have some knowledge of and input into the records about
them maintained by government agencies and businesses. The principles
require transparency in the record systems and provide individuals with a
right to ensure that the information is accurate. What problems or harms are
caused when people are not informed about the information entities have
about them?
I refer to the failure to provide individuals with notice and input about
their records as exclusion. There are a number of justifications for exclusion. Providing notice to people about the uses of their personal information and giving them rights to access and correct it can be costly. Also,
government agencies might want to keep certain record systems pertaining
to law enforcement or intelligence confidential so as not to tip off those who
are being investigated.
Exclusion, however, creates an architectural problem. Exclusion reduces accountability on the part of government agencies and businesses that
maintain records about individuals. Exclusion is also related to insecurity,
as the lack of accountability often goes hand-in-hand with inadequate security in record systems of personal data. Exclusion is different than insecurity in that exclusion is not primarily a harm caused by the lack of protection
against data leakage or contamination. Rather, it is a harm created by being
shut out from participating in the use of one’s personal data, by not being
informed about how that data is used, and by not being able to do anything
to affect how it is used.
One might contend that exclusion is not a harm in and of itself but is
merely a factor that leads to downstream harms like information dissemination. Exclusion, however, can be harmful even if it does not lead to the dissemination of data. As with secondary use and insecurity, exclusion creates
a sense of vulnerability and uncertainty in individuals. An inability to participate in the maintenance and use of one’s information can lead to feelings
of powerlessness and frustration. Some might argue that there are many aspects of life in which we are powerless, and that there is nothing special
about powerlessness with respect to personal information. But in a world

235

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 41.

522

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

where personal information is increasingly used to make important decisions about our lives, powerlessness in this arena can be significantly troublesome.
Tort law, by and large, has not recognized exclusion as a harm. In certain kinds of special relationships, however, tort law has developed strong
duties and responsibilities. The law of fiduciary duties creates special duties
of accountability within certain relationships. A fiduciary relationship exists when one party stands in a special position of power over another person.236 New York Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo described the relationship best when he wrote:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behav237
ior.

Fiduciary relationships have been held to protect privacy in certain relationships.238 In this way, exclusion is related to the harm of breach of confidentiality, which is discussed later in this taxonomy.239 Moreover, in certain relationships, such as between doctors and patients, fiduciary duties
require informed consent. As one court has noted, “in soliciting the patient’s consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty to disclose all information
material to the patient’s decision.”240 Therefore, tort law has at least recognized the concept of accountability, although courts have not recognized the
maintenance of personal information about a person as giving rise to fiduciary obligations. Such a development is not foreclosed, however, as courts
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See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (defining a
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For example, the tort of breach of confidentiality protects the privacy of people’s
communications with their doctors, bankers, lawyers, and others. See Ind. Nat’l Bank v.
Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a bank has a duty not to
disclose customer information unless it is to someone with a legitimate public interest); Kohn
v. Schiappa, 656 A.2d 1322, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (allowing a claim of negligence where an attorney harmed a client by disclosing confidential information); Biddle v.
Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (recognizing a cause of action when
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See infra Part C.1.
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“have carefully refrained from defining instances of fiduciary relations in
such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded.”241
The primary legal protection against exclusion is statutory. Federal privacy statutes guard against exclusion by mandating transparency and granting individuals the right to access their information. For example, the Privacy Act provides people the right to access their records.242 So do the
Cable Communications Policy Act,243 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,244 and
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act.245 Several privacy statutes
allow people a mechanism to demand the correction of inaccurate information in their records.246 While these statutes stop short of requiring informed consent, they do give people some ability to discover the information gathered about them.
Some statutes also allow people to opt out of certain uses of information. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, for example, allows people to refuse to
allow financial institutions to share their data with third parties.247 The optout right, which assumes consent unless an individual affirmatively indicates a preference for not sharing the information, does not ensure that consent is informed beyond providing customers with notice that information
may be shared. Accordingly, it would most likely fail to constitute informed consent within a fiduciary relationship.
C. Information Dissemination
Thus far, I have discussed harms arising out of the collection of information as well as harms arising from the storage and use of data. “Information dissemination” is one of the broadest groupings of privacy harms.
These harms consist of the revelation of personal data or the threat of
spreading information. This group includes (1) breach of confidentiality,
(2) disclosure, (3) exposure, (4) increased accessibility, (5) blackmail, (6)
appropriation, and (7) distortion.
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1. Breach of Confidentiality
Mrs. McCormick was involved in a contentious divorce and custody
battle with her husband. McCormick’s doctor gave a letter to her husband
that stated that McCormick was suffering from “major depression and alcoholism, acute and chronic.”248 McCormick sued her doctor. According to
the court, a “majority of the jurisdictions faced with the issue have recognized a cause of action against a physician for the unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information unless the disclosure is compelled by law or is in
the patient’s interest or the public interest.”249 Unlike the tort of public disclosure, the tort of breach of confidentiality does not require that the disclosure be “highly offensive.”250 The court reasoned that the public disclosure
tort “focuses on the content, rather than the source of the information. The
unauthorized revelation of confidential medical information should be protected without regard to the degree of its offensiveness.”251 The tort of
breach of confidentiality applies not only to physicians, but also to bankers
and other professionals who maintain relationships of trust.252 Additionally,
some courts have extended liability to third parties who induce the physician to disclose.253
Why does the law recognize a separate cause of action for breach of
confidentiality? Why not rectify such harms with the tort of public disclosure?
The answer, I posit, is that disclosure and breach of confidentiality
cause different kinds of injuries. Both involve the revelation of secrets
about a person, but breaches of confidentiality also violate the trust in a specific relationship. In this way, the tort emerges from the concept of a fidu-

248

McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 432 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
250
Id. at 438.
251
Id.
252
See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (recognizing a breach of confidentiality tort for disclosure by a bank). For more information on the
breach of confidentiality tort, see generally Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1426 (1982) (identifying “the present contours of
the . . . tort” and proposing a general rule for its application). Interestingly, England, which
does not recognize the privacy torts, does recognize breach of confidence, which has become
the country’s central means of protecting privacy. RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY AND PRESS
FREEDOM 48-58 (1995). Unlike the American version, which applies only in a few narrow
contexts (mainly to the patient-physician relationship), the English tort applies much more
generally and extends even to spouses and lovers. Id. at 51.
253
See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (holding an insurance company liable for inducing a physician to disclose confidential information).
249
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ciary relationship, which is “founded on trust or confidence reposed by one
person in the integrity and fidelity of another.”254
The harm from a breach of confidence, then, is not simply that information has been disclosed, but that the victim has been betrayed. When it recognized a cause of action for breach of confidentiality in 1920, the court in
Simonsen v. Swenson noted that “the physician is bound, . . . upon his own
professional honor and the ethics of his high profession, to keep secret [a
patient’s information]. . . . A wrongful breach of such confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for the damages naturally flowing from such wrong.”255
Protection against breach of confidentiality helps promote certain relationships that depend upon trust. The disclosure tort also protects relationships of trust, but disclosure must result in the release of embarrassing secrets or discrediting data before courts will consider it to be harmful.256
Breach of confidentiality requires only a betrayal of trust, regardless of the
nature of the data revealed.
There are certainly instances where we might find the breach of confidentiality desirable. In Simonsen, for example, the court concluded that a
doctor should not be held liable for disclosing the fact that a patient had
syphilis, which at the time was believed to be a highly contagious disease.257
The court held that protecting public health outweighed any privacy interest
the plaintiff might have.258 Likewise, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, a psychotherapy patient murdered a young woman with
whom he was obsessed.259 The court concluded that the patient’s psychotherapist had a duty to the woman because he had knowledge that his patient
posed a danger to her:
[T]he therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy
of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threat260
ened danger.

The law, however, is inconsistent in its recognition of breach of confidentiality as a harm. Fourth Amendment law fails altogether to recognize
the breach of confidentiality as a harm. In United States v. Miller, federal
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 339 N.Y.S.2d 623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920).
See infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
177 N.W. at 831.
Id. at 832.
551 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
Id. at 347.
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law enforcement officials issued subpoenas to two banks to produce a customer’s financial records.261 The banks complied with the subpoenas, but
the customer was not notified of the disclosure of the records until later in
the course of prosecution.262 The defendant contended that the subpoenas
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.263 The Court concluded, however,
that the customer lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial
records maintained by his bank.264 According to the Court, “the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.”265 Moreover,
the Court contended, “[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed
to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”266
A few years later, the Court employed similar reasoning in Smith v.
Maryland, where it held that people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the phone numbers they dial because people “know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company” and, therefore, they cannot
“harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.”267
Miller and Smith are the leading cases in what has become known as the
“third party doctrine.”268 This doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. In the Information Age, much of what we do is recorded by third
parties.269 The third party doctrine therefore places an extensive amount of
personal information outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment.270
The third party doctrine is based on the secrecy paradigm: since others
know the information, it is no longer completely secret. But the fact that the
information is known to third parties would not be relevant to the Court’s
analysis if the harm were understood to be a breach of confidentiality.
261

425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (limited by Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401-3421 (2000)).
262
Id. at 438.
263
Id. at 438-39.
264
Id. at 442.
265
Id. at 443.
266
Id. at 442.
267
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
268
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 201.
269
See id. at 202-09 (discussing the consequences of applying outdated privacy protection schemes to modern times).
270
Id. at 201-02.
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When people establish a relationship with banks, Internet service providers,
phone companies, and other businesses, they are not disclosing their information to the world. They are giving it to a party with implicit (and often
explicit) promises that the information will not be disseminated.271
Unlike Fourth Amendment law, tort law recognizes breach of confidentiality as a distinct harm. The breach of confidentiality tort applies to the
patient-physician relationship and to other relationships as well. As mentioned previously, some courts have held that the tort applies to banks.272 In
Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, the court observed: “All agree that a
bank should protect its business records from the prying eyes of the public,
moved by curiosity or malice. No one questions its right to protect its fiduciary relationship with its customers, which, in sound banking practice, as a
matter of common knowledge, is done everywhere.”273 Not divulging customers’ financial information to others “is an implied term of the contract
between a banker and his customer.”274 Moreover, the court reasoned: “Inviolate secrecy is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or depositors.”275 Many other courts
have agreed.276

2. Disclosure
The law has developed a number of protections against disclosures of
true information about people. The tort of public disclosure of private facts,
inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s article, creates a cause of action for one
who publicly discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive to a reason-

271

See, e.g., Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929) (finding an “implied obligation” on banks to keep customers’ bank records confidential until compelled by a court to disclose them).
272
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
273
367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (quoting United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Mobile,
67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946)).
274
Id. at 290 (quoting 7 AM. JUR. Banks § 196 (1937)).
275
Id.
276
See, e.g., Barnett Bank of W. Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 926 (Fla. 1986) (recognizing that banks establish fiduciary relationships with customers when they enter into transactions); Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (finding an
implied contract not to disclose personal financial information between a bank and its customers); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (“[A] bank
implicitly warrants to maintain, in strict confidence, information regarding its depositor’s affairs.”); Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn. 1976) (recognizing a duty of confidentiality for banks); McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1998) (finding a duty for a bank to keep its customers’ account information confidential).
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able person” and “is not of legitimate concern to the public.”277 In Whalen
v. Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that the “right to privacy” based on
substantive due process also encompassed the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”278 Although this branch of the right to
privacy has not received much further elaboration by the Court, it is recognized in many circuits, where it can enable plaintiffs to sue government officials for disclosing personal information.279 Further, a number of statutes
restrict disclosure of information from government records,280 school records,281 cable company records,282 video records,283 motor vehicle records,284 and health records.285 Various states have restricted the disclosure
of particular forms of information, such as medical data and alcohol and
drug abuse.286
Why does the law protect people against the disclosure of true information about them? Some critics of such protections contend that they infringe
upon free speech. Eugene Volokh argues that “the right to information privacy—my right to control your communication of personally identifiable
information about me—is a right to have the government stop you from
speaking about me.”287 Others have charged that protection against disclo277

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); see Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 21, at 195-96.
278
429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977).
279
See, e.g., Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that it was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right to information privacy for police to disclose to neighbors that the plaintiff’s husband was infected with AIDS).
280
See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(10) (2000) (prohibiting agencies from disclosing information about an individual without her prior written consent).
281
See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)
(2000) (requiring educational agencies or institutions that receive government funding not to disclose education records without written consent).
282
See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 551(b)-(c) (2000) (limiting the extent to which a cable service may collect or disclose personally identifiable information
about subscribers).
283
See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2000) (creating civil
liability for video stores that disclose personally identifiable information about any customer).
284
See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000) (restricting the use of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records).
285
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-2 (2000) (protecting the privacy of personal health information in transactions).
286
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1990) (repealed 1995)
(prohibiting, inter alia, disclosure of HIV test results); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 2001) (permitting the release of medical records of minors relating to sexually transmitted
diseases and abortion upon written request, but prohibiting the disclosure to parents without
consent); 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1690.108 (West 1990) (prohibiting the disclosure of all records prepared during alcohol or drug abuse treatment).
287
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51
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sure inhibits our ability to judge others and determine whether they are worthy of our trust. According to Richard Posner, disclosure protections provide people the “power to conceal information about themselves that others
might use to their disadvantage.”288
“Disclosure” occurs when certain true information about a person is revealed to others. Disclosure differs from breach of confidentiality because
the harm in disclosure involves the damage to reputation caused by the dissemination; the harm with breach of confidentiality is the violation of trust
in the relationship.289 Disclosure can harm even if the information is revealed by a stranger. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis took
issue with the argument that express or implied contractual duties of confidentiality could adequately protect privacy.290 In particular, they noted that
strangers were increasingly able to gather personal information:
The narrower doctrine [of breach of contract] may have satisfied the demands
of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could rarely have
arisen without violating a contract or a special confidence; but now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs
without any participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the
291
law must be placed upon a broader foundation.

Warren and Brandeis pointed to new technologies of photography.
Previously, cameras were large and expensive, and people had to sit and
pose for their picture to be taken. This gave rise to a relationship with implicit contractual terms. But the invention of the “snap camera,” a smaller
camera that could take candid photographs, “rendered it possible to take pictures surreptitiously.”292 This led Warren and Brandeis to conclude that
“the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate to support the required
protection.”293
Although protecting against disclosure does limit freedom of speech,
disclosure can inhibit the very interests free speech protects. Protection
from disclosure, like free speech, promotes individual autonomy. The risk
of disclosure can prevent people from engaging in activities that further

(2000); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 556 (1970)
(“[T]he right of privacy depends upon guaranteeing an individual freedom from intrusion and
freedom to think and believe, not freedom from discussion of his opinions, actions or affairs.”).
288
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 271 (1983).
289
See supra Part C.1.
290
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 210.
291
Id. at 210-11.
292
Id. at 211.
293
Id.
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their own self-development.294 Second, as with free speech, disclosure protections further democratic self-governance. A substantial amount of political discourse does not occur on public soap boxes, but rather in private conversations.295 Disclosure can inhibit people from associating with others,
impinging upon freedom of association, and can also destroy anonymity,
which is sometimes critical for the promotion of free expression.296
Disclosure can also threaten people’s security. For example, many
people have good reason to keep their addresses secret, including victims of
stalking and domestic abuse attempting to hide from those that threaten
them, police officers and prosecutors fearing retaliation by criminals, celebrities desiring to avoid harassment by paparazzi, and doctors who perform
abortions desiring to protect their family’s safety. People want to protect
information that makes them vulnerable or that can be used by others to
harm them physically, emotionally, financially, and reputationally. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a deranged man was obsessed with
Amy Lynn Boyer.297 He purchased Boyer’s Social Security number and
employment address from a database company called Docusearch. The man
went to Boyer’s workplace and murdered her. The court concluded that
“threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk
of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has
a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal information to a client.”298
In many instances, disclosure of information about a person will not enhance our ability to judge her; in fact, it can distort our assessments.299
Knowing bits and pieces of gossip about a person will often not paint a
more complete portrait; it can lead to misimpressions and condemnation
without full understanding. Disclosure protections also guard against irra-

294

See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 990-92 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Virtues].
295
Id. at 994.
296
See id. at 995 (“Protection against disclosure protects freedom of association, for it
enables people to join together and exchange information without having to fear loss of employment, community shunning, and other social reprisals.” (footnote omitted)).
297
816 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (N.H. 2003).
298
Id. at 1008.
299
See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 200 (2000) (“[C]hanges in media technology have increased the risk of mistaking
information for knowledge.”); Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J.
2063, 2068-69 (2001) (arguing that access to limited amounts of information only “creates the
impression of knowledge”); Solove, Virtues, supra note 294, at 1037 (“Much misunderstanding occurs because of the disclosure of private information . . . .”).
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tional judgment based on stereotypes of misinformation about diseases.300
Likewise, society may want to inhibit certain rational judgments, such as
employment decisions based on genetic information. Even if employers are
correct that a prospective employee with a genetic risk for developing a certain condition is, on balance, riskier to hire than a prospective employee
without such a predisposition, even such a rational discriminatory employment decision has its costs. Such decisions may penalize people for things
they cannot control and deter people from learning their genetic makeup.301
Disclosure can also be harmful because it makes a person a “prisoner of
[her] recorded past.”302 People grow and change, and disclosures of information from their past can inhibit their ability to reform their behavior, to
have a second chance, or to alter their life’s direction. Moreover, when information is released publicly, it can be used in a host of unforeseeable
ways, creating problems related to those caused by secondary use.
The law often protects against disclosure when the information is kept
secret but not when others know about it. As one court observed, appearing
in public “necessarily involves doffing the cloak of privacy which the law
protects.”303 In Penwell v. Taft Broadcasting Co., the court held that a husband and wife wrongfully arrested in public had no privacy interest against
the broadcast of video footage of the arrest because it was filmed in public
and was “left open to the public eye.”304 Moreover, if a fact about a person
is known to others, many courts conclude that it is no longer private. This
was the case in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., where newspapers
“outed” Oliver Sipple, who heroically saved President Ford from an assassination attempt.305 The court concluded that his sexuality was not private
because it was well known in the gay community.306 In Duran v. Detroit
News, Inc., a former Colombian judge was attempting to lay low because of
death threats and a bounty placed on her head by a drug lord.307 When a
newspaper disclosed her address, a court found no privacy interest because

300

See Solove, Virtues, supra note 294, at 1041-42 (describing the stigma attached to
those with certain diseases and illnesses).
301
Cf. id. at 1042-43.
302
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at 112.
303
Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
304
469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Playboy Enters.,
574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
305
201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 666 (Ct. App. 1984).
306
Id. at 669 (“[P]rior to the publication of the newspaper articles in question [Sipple]’s
homosexual orientation and participation in gay community activities had been known by
hundereds of people in a variety of cities . . . .”).
307
504 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).

532

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

she had revealed it to a few people.308 A few courts, however, have come to
different conclusions regarding whether there is a privacy interest in information communicated to others. For example, in Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, the identity of a murder witness was disclosed in a newspaper
article.309 Although the witness had confided in a few friends and family
members, she had not “rendered otherwise private information public by
cooperating in the criminal investigation and seeking solace from friends
and relatives.”310
Lior Strahilevitz aptly observes that disclosure involves spreading information beyond existing networks of information flow.311 The harm of
disclosure is not so much the elimination of secrecy as it is the spreading of
information beyond expected boundaries. People often disclose information
to a limited circle of friends, and they expect the information to stay within
this group. Some courts, however, focus on secrecy and do not examine
people’s expectations of information flow.312
3. Exposure
In an 1881 case, DeMay v. Roberts, a young unmarried man accompanied a doctor into the room where the doctor was assisting a woman in labor.313 The court held that the young man had no business being in the
room: “It would be shocking to our sense of right, justice and propriety to
doubt even but that for such an act the law would afford an ample remedy.”314 Why is it “shocking” for a stranger to watch a woman give birth to
a baby?

308

Id. at 720 (finding her identity to be “open to the public eye” because her work in
Colombia had been disclosed in newspaper articles, and because she had occasionally used
her real name in the United States); see also Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 578
N.E.2d 901, 903 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (holding that the disclosure of a public conversation between a plaintiff and her fellow employees was not a privacy violation).
309
244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (Ct. App. 1988).
310
Id. at 561; see also Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 500 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that the plaintiff’s disclosure of his infection status to family, friends, and
members of an HIV support group did not render the information public); Y.G. v. Jewish
Hosp., 795 S.W.2d 488, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that disclosure to doctors and other
participants of the plaintiff’s in vitro fertilization did not render that information public).
311
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 974 (2005) (arguing that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy where
there is a low risk that the information will spread beyond the individual’s social network).
312
See id. at 943-45 (describing “hard-line” cases in which plaintiffs’ limited disclosures
barred their privacy claims).
313
9 N.W. 146, 146 (Mich. 1881).
314
Id. at 148-49.
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In 2004, in National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, the
Supreme Court rejected a request under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) for autopsy photos of Vincent Foster, Jr., a deputy counsel to President Clinton who had committed suicide by shooting himself.315 The Court
concluded that the photos fell under the exemption for records that “could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.”316 The Court contended: “Family members have a personal stake
in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the
rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once
their own.”317
Why is it indecent to publish autopsy photographs? What harm does it
cause the families? Imagine that a newspaper prints candid photographs of
a person naked or of a person defecating. The person would likely be appalled. But why? We all have genitals. We all defecate. There are no big
surprises here.
These are all illustrations of a disruption I call “exposure.” Exposure
involves the exposing to others of certain physical and emotional attributes
about a person. These are attributes that people view as deeply primordial,
and their exposure often creates embarrassment and humiliation. Grief, suffering, trauma, injury, nudity, sex, urination, and defecation all involve primal aspects of our lives—ones that are physical, instinctual, and necessary.318 We have been socialized into concealing these activities.319
Although exposure is similar to disclosure—both involve the dissemination of true information—they diverge in an important respect. Exposure
is related to disclosure in that concealed information is revealed to others,
but the information is not revealing of anything we typically use to judge
people’s character. Unlike disclosure, exposure rarely reveals any signifi315
316

541 U.S. 157, 175 (2004).
Id. at 171 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000))(internal quotation marks omit-

ted).
317

Id. at 168. Courts have also allowed tort suits based on the dissemination of autopsy
photos. See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 339-42 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that relatives of deceased persons maintained a cause of action for invasion of privacy when
coroner’s office employees disseminated autopsy photos).
318
See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 177 (1999)
(“Sex is an area in which we encounter our desires, prejudices and shame, and cloak these
emotions in privacy.”).
319
See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS 114 (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1994)
(1939) (“The social reference of shame and embarrassment recedes more and more from consciousness. Precisely because the social command not to show oneself exposed or performing
natural functions now operates with regard to everyone[,] . . . it seems to the adult a command
of his own inner self . . . .”).
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cant new information that can be used in the assessment of a person’s character or personality.
Exposure creates injury because we have developed social practices to
conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or disgusting. Further, in
certain activities, we are vulnerable and weak, such as when we are nude or
going to the bathroom. Norms about nudity and bodily functions have
changed throughout history.320 Martha Nussbaum points out that ancient
Romans used toilets whereas “courtiers in Elizabethan England urinated and
defecated in corners of palaces, until the stench made it necessary to change
residences.”321 In various cultures and at different times in history, levels of
reticence and modesty concerning the body have differed greatly.322 Today’s norms and practices, however, call for the concealment of many aspects of the body, bodily functions, and strong displays of emotion. We
protect against the exposure of these bodily aspects because this protection
safeguards human dignity as defined by modern society. Dignity is a part of
being civilized; it involves the ability to transcend one’s animal nature.323
The need for privacy, and therefore the prevention of exposure, is created by the fact that we have social relationships and concomitant norms of
dignity and decorum.324 “The private arises as a necessary space for the
production of civilized behavior,” William Ian Miller contends.325 “Private
space enables a civilized public space.”326

320

See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1135-36 (observing that public bathing was common in the Middle Ages, but that by the sixteenth century concealment of
the body had become the norm).
321
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW 115-16 (2004).
322
See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 11, at 1135-36 (comparing ancient
Greece, where public nudity was seen as a sign of strength, to Renaissance Europe, where
“among the wealthy . . . people tried to distance themselves from their body and other’s bodies”).
323
See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 177 (1997) (“The civilizing
process, according to [Norbert] Elias, means the expansion of the private sphere at the expense of the public. The new norms demand private spaces in which one prepares, grooms,
and does the things that would disgust others if they were to be witnessed.”); CARL D.
SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE, AND PRIVACY 49 (W.W. Norton 1992) (1977) (“The open
display of bodily functions—defecating, great pain, the process of dying—threatens the dignity of the individual, revealing an individual vulnerable to being reduced to his bodily existence, bound by necessity.”).
324
Certain activities, such as defecation, we view as uncivilized to perform in front of
others. As William Ian Miller observes: “Clearly defecation is degrading and contaminating.
It is hedged in with rules about appropriateness as to place. And to violate those rules is a
cause for disgrace and shame . . . .” MILLER, supra note 323, at 147 (footnote omitted).
325
Id. at 178.
326
Id.
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When these practices are disrupted by exposure, people can experience
a severe and sometimes debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem.
Exposure thus impedes a person’s ability to participate in society. Even
though most people would not view a victim of exposure as a lesser person
or as being less civilized, victims feel that way. This is in contrast to disclosure, where information often alters the way a person is perceived.
Disclosure is a power that controls through the imposition of social
sanctions and condemnation. Exposure works in a different way, by stripping people of their dignity.327 Exposure interacts with powerful and potent
social norms. When people willingly transgress these norms, society has a
strong interest in shaming them, and it is socially beneficial for these norms
to be internalized and to result in feelings of shame. However, exposure involves people unwillingly placed in transgression of these norms. We do
not view the victims as blameworthy, and there is little social value in their
suffering. Nevertheless, due to the internalization of these norms, exposure
victims experience strong feelings of shame.
Tort law does not recognize a separate cause of action for exposure; the
tort of public disclosure covers both disclosure and exposure.328 Generally,
exposure cases have fared better than ones involving disclosure.329 For example, in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, air jets blew up a woman’s
dress while she was at a county fair, exposing her underwear.330 At that
very moment, a photographer for the local newspaper took her photograph,
and the picture was printed on the front page of the paper.331 The woman
sued under the public disclosure tort.332 The newspaper contended that the
picture was taken in public, and that, accordingly, there was no privacy interest.333 This reasoning was based on the secrecy paradigm—that once
something is disclosed to the public, it is no longer secret. However, the
court concluded that the woman still had a right to be protected from “an
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One victim of Chicago’s invasive strip search policy testified that “the incident
caused her emotional distress that manifested itself in reduced socializing, poor work performance, paranoia, suicidal feelings, depression, and an inability to disrobe in any place other
than a closet.” Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1985).
328
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977).
329
Eugene Volokh explains that this difference may be because the information revealed
via exposure is less useful to those to whom the information is given than that revealed via
disclosure. Volokh, supra note 287, at 1094.
330
162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964).
331
Id.
332
Id. at 476-77.
333
Id. at 477.
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indecent and vulgar” violation of privacy under the tort of public disclosure.334
Failing to distinguish between disclosure and exposure has adversely
affected the recognition of exposure harms in some instances. In McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., for example, a newspaper published a
picture of a high school athlete whose genitalia was accidentally exposed
while playing soccer.335 The student sued under the tort of public disclosure
of private facts.336 According to the student, “the Newspaper violated the
bounds of public decency.”337 The court conceptualized the injury as one of
disclosure and concluded that the picture was not private because “[the student] was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport at a public place.”338
The harm in this case, however, is more appropriately classified as one of
exposure. Had the court conceptualized the disruption as one of exposure,
the fact that it occurred in a public place would have been much less relevant to the analysis.
4. Increased Accessibility
The federal courts, along with many state courts and agencies, are developing systems to place their records online.339 These records are readily
available at local courthouses or government offices. Nevertheless, placing
them online has given rise to an extensive debate over privacy. Some argue
that the information is already publicly available, and that therefore it
should be available on the Internet in the same manner as it is in physical
form at the localities. But many administrative bodies charged with examining the issue have hesitated because of the increased accessibility the
Internet will bring. The federal Judicial Conference Committee concluded,
for example, that “any benefits of public remote electronic access to criminal files were outweighed by the safety and law enforcement risks such access would create.”340

334

Id. at 478.
802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. App. 1991).
336
Id.
337
Id. at 905.
338
Id.
339
See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 131-32 (observing that digital
filing requirements and the conversion of paper files to digital format will lead to significant
online accessibility of court records).
340
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., REPORT ON
PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
Policy.htm.
335
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If the information is already available to the public, then what is the
harm in increasing its accessibility? Increased accessibility does not involve
a direct disclosure. Secret information is not disclosed. Rather, information
that is already available to the public is made easier to access. Unlike disclosure, the harm is not a direct revealing of information to another. Confidentiality is not breached; the cat is already out of the bag. With increased
accessibility, a difference in quantity becomes a difference in quality—it
enhances the risk of the harms of disclosure.
Increased accessibility to personal information has many benefits. It
enhances openness, allowing people to locate information that they are
seeking more easily. Ready accessibility of records enables attorneys to
track down people’s addresses to serve process. It can assist in investigating the background of a person that one is planning to hire as a child caregiver or teacher. As Robert Gellman notes: “Some basic functions and institutions depend on the public availability of records to operate. The U.S.
system of land ownership relies on the public availability of records, although that has not always been the case. The public availability of bankruptcy records is also integral to the process.”341
Increased accessibility, however, creates problems such as the increased
possibility of disclosure. Information can readily be exploited for purposes
other than those for which it was originally made publicly accessible. For
example, companies are gathering data from public records to use for commercial and marketing purposes or to create dossiers on individuals for profiling and other analysis.342 As Peter Winn notes, increased access to court
records will cause harms to participants in the judicial system: “They will
lose . . . their interest in privacy—their identities will be subject to potential
misuse by thieves, and their children may be exposed to sexual predators.”343
Under the secrecy paradigm, courts often view privacy as a binary
status—information is either completely private or completely public.344
Accordingly, once information is released into the public domain, it is no
longer private. According to the Restatement, for the tort of public disclosure, “[t]here is no liability when the defendant merely gives further public341

Robert Gellman, Public Records, Public Policy, and Privacy, HUMAN RTS., Winter
1999, at 7, 9.
342
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 40, at 131-32; see also Gellman, supra
note 341, at 7 (warning that although “[p]rivacy protections were inherent in the technology of
paper,” digitization has led to increased accessibility).
343
Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 315 (2004).
344
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of the secrecy paradigm.

538

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 477

ity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.”345 For the harm
of increased accessibility, however, prior publicity is not dispositive. One
must focus on the extent to which the information is made more accessible.
Most courts, however, due to their commitment to the secrecy paradigm,
struggle with recognizing this harm.346 In Walls v. City of Petersburg, for
example, public employees were compelled to answer a questionnaire asking about the criminal histories of their family members, their complete
marital history, their children, and their financial status.347 The court dismissed their claim that their constitutional right to information privacy was
violated, reasoning that there was no privacy interest in the information because it was already available in public records.348
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court recognized the problem of increased accessibility.349 Earlier in this Article, I noted how this case also
recognized the problem of aggregation when the Court concluded that the
disclosure of FBI “rap sheets” violated a cognizable privacy interest under
FOIA.350 In addition to concluding that there was a difference between
scattered pieces of information and a fully assembled dossier, the Court recognized that “there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”351 Here, the Court
has recognized the harm of increased accessibility.352

345

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the constitutional right to information privacy did not apply to the disclosure of police records because
“one’s criminal history is arguably not a private ‘personal matter’ at all, since arrest and conviction information are matters of public record”); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264,
268-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that “an individual cannot expect to have a constitutionally
protected privacy interest in matters of public record” but that plaintiff’s HIV status was not a
matter of public record); Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that because information about the victim’s claims of spousal abuse potentially
“would have wound up on the public record,” the victim did not have a privacy interest in the
claims).
347
895 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1990).
348
Id. at 193-94.
349
See 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (observing that the “practical obscurity” of a rap sheet
is an important element in personal privacy).
350
See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
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Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764.
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Id. at 780.
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5. Blackmail
In nineteenth-century England, sodomy was a serious offense. Although no longer a capital offense—as it had been in the seventeenth century—sodomy still carried harsh penalties from ten years to life in prison.353
Blackmailers would threaten wealthy elites with disclosure of their homosexual activities unless the blackmailers were paid handsomely. The law
began to recognize that such forms of extortion should be criminalized.
When a blackmail case came to court, courts would awkwardly ignore
whether there was any truth to the blackmailer’s charges.354 Certainly not
all victims of blackmail were innocent, yet courts offered protection even to
those accused of transgressing society’s strong sexual taboos and criminal
laws. Why were such people protected? If the society so vehemently condemned sodomy at the time, why punish the blackmailers rather than those
who may have been guilty of sodomy?
One nineteenth-century English judge contended that blackmail was
“one of the worst offenses known to the law.”355 As historian Angus
McLaren notes:
The courts had for centuries reassured the [wealthy] that their good names
were protected by the laws on libel and slander. The publicity given to the
emergence of the blackmailer raised the horrific possibility that the pillaging of
the propertied could be carried out by those who threatened not to tell hurtful
356
lies, but obscene truths.

Blackmail has long posed a conundrum for legal scholars.357 Blackmail
involves coercing an individual by threatening to expose her personal secrets if she does not accede to the demands of the blackmailer, which often
involve paying hush money.358 Why should society restrict contracts not to
353

ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL 17 (2002) (noting that there were no executions for sodomy in England after 1836).
354
See id. at 21 (explaining that “[v]ictims who appeared to have engaged in same-sex
activities put the courts in a potentially awkward situation,” as the courts did not want to exonerate those who had engaged in same-sex activities).
355
Id. at 20 (quoting Central Criminal Court, TIMES (London), June 20, 1895, at 3).
356
Id. at 28-29.
357
See LEO KATZ, ILL GOTTEN GAINS 140-45 (1996) (discussing various philosophers’
interpretations of the connection between blackmail and coercion and the difficulties of formulating a complete theory). The term “blackmail” originated in Tudor times and referred to
extortion in general. MCLAREN, supra note 353, at 12. “Modern blackmail first emerged
when criminals in the eighteenth century recognized that the laws against sodomy provided
them with the means by which they could extort money from those whom they could entrap.”
Id. at 3.
358
See 31A AM. JUR. 2D, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 20 (2002) (recognizing
that, although statutes differ in form, the use of a threat to extract something is at the heart of
blackmail). For a discussion of how blackmail laws protected reputations in different periods
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divulge secrets? Blackmail does not seem to be about preventing disclosure, for as Joseph Izenberg argues, prohibiting a blackmailer compensation
for silence will likely make disclosure more probable.359 If this is the case,
then what interest does the crime of blackmail protect?
Scholars have offered a panoply of hypotheses. Richard Posner argues
that blackmail is illegal because it neither maximizes wealth nor provides
any net social benefit.360 In contrast, Gary Anderson and Walter Block contend that blackmail, as distinct from extortion, involves a transaction just
like any other, in which both parties bargain for the result they desire.361
Jennifer Brown finds that blackmail undermines the criminal justice system
by enabling private contracts that withhold information from the justice system.362 Richard Epstein proposes that blackmail is socially detrimental because it “breeds fraud and deceit.”363 According to Wendy Gordon, blackmail is illegal because it involves the blackmailer treating the victim as a
means (to earn money) rather than an end.364 Finally, Richard McAdams
argues that blackmail inhibits the development of social norms by stifling
public norm enforcement and the discussion and critique of norms.365
I posit that blackmail is criminalized because of the power relationship
it creates. Blackmail allows a person to be dominated and controlled by another. With blackmail, the harm is not in the actual disclosure of the information, but in the control exercised by the one who makes the threat over
the data subject. In some cases, blackmail can also involve information
more akin to exposure than disclosure. Breach of confidentiality is also related to blackmail, as a confidant can threaten to disclose a secret in return

of American history, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and
Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1112-13 (2002) (observing
that blackmail went “against the American grain” of allowing second chances and fresh
starts).
359
Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail From A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1914 (1993)
(noting that in any given case, individuals who have obtained valuable information are most
likely to disclose it in the presence of a law forbidding bargaining for secrecy with data subjects, though in the long run, such laws will deter potential blackmailers from digging for
valuable information).
360
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1817, 1818-20 (1993).
361
Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion and Exchange, 44 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 541, 544-47 (2001).
362
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935,
1971 (1993).
363
Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 565 (1983).
364
Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail’s Central Case,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1761 (1993).
365
Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2243-64 (1996).
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for money. Blackmail differs from disclosure, exposure, and breach of confidentiality in that it involves a threat of disclosure rather than an actual disclosure.
A rough analogy may be made to the crimes of battery and assault.
Battery involves actual physical harm, whereas assault is putting a person in
fear of physical harm.366 But there are important differences between
blackmail and assault. Unlike assault, where the violence threatened is illegal, with blackmail, the threatened disclosure can be perfectly legal. Indeed, the disclosure might be socially beneficial in that it might reveal that
the blackmail victim committed a crime or heinous act. But the threat of
disclosure is so profoundly disempowering that society still wants to protect
against it. Toward the end of Henrik Ibsen’s play, Hedda Gabler, Judge
Brack, who knows a damaging secret about Hedda Gabler, says to her, “My
dearest Hedda, believe me I shall not abuse the position.” Hedda replies,
“In your power, all the same. At the mercy of your will and demands. And
so a slave! A slave!”367 The more people know about us, the more they can
exercise control over us. This is why telling one’s deepest secrets to another
makes one vulnerable. Prohibiting blackmail prevents people from taking
advantage of us with our personal information.
The purpose of restricting blackmail is not to limit disclosure but to
prevent the use of the threat of disclosure as a tool for exerting power and
dominion over others. Our society prohibits slavery, labor below the minimum wage, dangerous workplace conditions, and quid pro quo sexual harassment even if the victim seemingly consents. The rationale for these prohibitions stems in part from the fact that these acts are so coercive that the
consent is not voluntary, and so place excessive power over one person in
the hands of another. Blackmail similarly demonstrates the profound danger of the threat of disclosure as an instrument of power over another person. Indeed, criminal codes classify blackmail as a form of extortion, which
involves the use of fear or threats to force someone to submit to another’s
will.368
The crime of blackmail thus prevents the use of disclosure, exposure, or
breach of confidentiality as a means for exercising power over another person. Dissemination of information is a powerful tool, one that can be

366

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (defining battery); id. § 21 (defining assault).
367
HENRIK IBSEN, Hedda Gabler, in HEDDA GABLER AND OTHER PLAYS 362 (Una
Ellis-Fermor trans., Penguin Books 1961).
368
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 1999) (defining extortion as “the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear”).
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wielded to achieve levels of domination and control that may not be socially
beneficial. This is why the threats are usually treated as part of the wrongful act itself.
6. Appropriation
In 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., a flour company
included a lithograph of Abigail Roberson, a minor, on 25,000 advertisement flyers without her consent.369 The flyers were captioned, “Flour of the
Family.”370 Roberson alleged that she “ha[d] been greatly humiliated by the
scoffs and jeers of persons who ha[d] recognized her face and picture on
this advertisement, and her good name ha[d] been attacked, causing her
great distress and suffering, both in body and mind.”371 The portrait, however, was neither racy nor libelous. “The likeness is said to be a very good
one,” the court noted, and Roberson was “caused to suffer mental distress
where others would have appreciated the compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the picture for such purposes.”372 The court refused
to recognize a remedy based on Warren and Brandeis’s article, concluding
that such an action was the proper domain of the legislature.373
Roberson caused quite a stir. An editorial in The New York Times lambasted the decision and noted that it “excited as much amazement among
lawyers and jurists as among the promiscuous lay public.”374 Shortly after
the decision, a comment in the Yale Law Journal criticized the Roberson
decision for not recognizing a remedy for the “undoubted injury to the
plaintiff.”375 The strong criticism of the decision even led one of the judges
of the majority to defend the opinion in the Columbia Law Review.376 A
year later, New York passed a law creating a cause of action to redress the
type of injury Roberson suffered.377 The law still remains viable today.378
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64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902).
Id.
371
Id. Roberson became so ill that she had to see a physician. Id.
372
Id. at 442-43.
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Id. at 447-48 (applying Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21).
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Editorial, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8, reprinted in Denis
O’Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 438 (1902).
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Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?: Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
Co., 12 YALE L.J. 35, 36 (1902).
376
O’Brien, supra note 374, at 437.
377
See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (1990) (noting that the statutes “made it both a tort
and a misdemeanor . . . to use another’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes
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N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992).
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The tort of appropriation was thus one of the first privacy torts to be
recognized after Warren and Brandeis’s article. The tort of appropriation
occurs when “[o]ne . . . appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another.”379 To be liable for appropriation, “the defendant must
have appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or
commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name
or likeness.”380
Why did Roberson create such a response? What spurred such an extensive public discussion and prompt legislative action? What is problematic about using a person’s name or photograph in an advertisement? After
all, one’s name and image are often not secret. The picture of Roberson was
flattering and did not ruin her reputation. What was the injury?
“Appropriation” is the use of one’s identity or personality for the purposes and goals of another. Appropriation, like the privacy disruptions of
disclosure and distortion, involves the way an individual desires to present
herself to society.
The tort of appropriation has currently lost its way, as courts and commentators have not been able to adequately explain the injury that is redressed by the tort. Two competing accounts of the injury predominate in
cases and commentary.381 Many commentators describe the harm caused by
the use of one’s likeness for commercial purposes as an affront to dignity;
Edward Bloustein argued that the harm caused to an individual by appropriation is the “demeaning and humiliating . . . commercialization of an aspect of personality.”382
Another rationale for the tort is as a protection of property rights.
Prosser, who was profoundly influential in the creation of the four modern
privacy torts, viewed the interest protected by the appropriation tort as “not
so much a mental as a proprietary one.”383 According to Jonathan Kahn, the
“early association of appropriation claims with such intangible, noncommensurable attributes of the self as dignity and the integrity of one’s
persona seems to have been lost, or at least misplaced, as property-based
conceptions of the legal status of identity have come to the fore.”384 Courts
379

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
Id. § 652C cmt. c.
381
See generally Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property,
and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991) (contrasting the “property” and
“dignity” rationales for the tort of appropriation).
382
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 987 (1964).
383
Prosser, supra note 20, at 406.
384
Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 223 (1999). A new
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have transformed a tort’s targeted harm from one of appropriation to one of
intellectual property. Most contemporary cases recognize that the tort of
appropriation protects a “valuable right of property.”385 Loss of property
seems to be more readily recognized by courts today than the more amorphous feelings of embarrassment or loss of dignity.386
To the extent that the tort remains a way to protect against the loss of
dignity, why should we inhibit social use of identities simply to prevent
people from feeling demeaned when their identities are commercialized?
After all, we allow people to sell their identities to endorse products. Further, we allow vigorous criticism and satire, which can be quite humiliating
and injurious to people’s dignity.
I contend that there is another important dimension of the harm of appropriation—an interference with freedom and self-development. The early
appropriation cases allude to this aspect of the harm. In 1905, Georgia became the first state to recognize a tort based on Warren and Brandeis’s article. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., a life insurance advertisement used a photograph of Paolo Pavesich next to a photograph of “an
ill-dressed and sickly looking person.”387 Under Pavesich’s picture, the advertisement stated in part: “In my healthy and productive period of life I
bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.”388 The ad
seemed flattering for Pavesich, for he was the paragon of all the success and
good fortune that would come to those who purchased insurance.389 Pavesich, however, was not flattered, and he sued.390 In contrast to the Roberson
court, the Pavesich court recognized a cause of action, reasoning that “the
body of a person cannot be put on exhibition . . . without his consent. The
right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all proper

tort, known as the “right of publicity,” has emerged to redress violations of property rights in
one’s name or likeness. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:63 (“Simplistically put,
while the appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche,
the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook.” (footnote omitted)) .
385
DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 6:1, at 375 (1991) (quoting McQueen v.
Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63, 66 (Ga. Ct. App.), rev’d on other grounds, 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga.
1968)).
386
See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 109, 114 (2003) (arguing that
Prosser’s characterization of appropriation as vindicating property interests obscured the dignitary interests the tort protected, and noting that “[m]odern courts are prone to subsuming the
privacy claim under the label of publicity”).
387
50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905).
388
Id. at 69.
389
Id.
390
Id.
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places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right of personal liberty.”391 The use of one’s likeness for advertising purposes can bring
even the individual of ordinary sensibility[] to a realization that his liberty has
been taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these
purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the
time being under the control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is
392
in reality a slave.

The court speaks in terms of loss of liberty, not in terms of loss of
monetary value. The injury is that Pavesich has been used against his will.
Similarly, according to Justice Gray’s dissent in Roberson, “we may not say
that the plaintiff’s complaint is fanciful, or that her alleged injury is purely a
sentimental one.”393 “[T]he conspicuous display of her likeness in various
public places has . . . humiliated her by the notoriety and by the public
comments it has provoked.”394 Justice Gray alluded to what I believe to be
the crux of the harm: unwanted notoriety. The appropriation of Roberson’s
image forced her to become a public figure. In addition to bringing her unwillingly into the public sphere, the appropriation defined her public role
and public persona.
The interest safeguarded by protections against appropriation is control
of the way one presents oneself to society. The products and causes people
publicly endorse shape their public image. When people are associated with
products, they become known in terms of these products. Many public figures take great care with their endorsements because these endorsements
shape their public image.395 Thus, appropriation can be harmful even if it is
not humiliating, degrading, or disrespectful. Being unwillingly used to endorse a product resembles, in certain respects, being compelled to speak and
to represent certain viewpoints.
Protection against appropriation establishes what society considers appropriate for others to do in shaping a person’s identity. The harm, then, is
391
392
393

Id. at 70.
Id. at 80.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dis-

senting).
394

Id.
For example, in 1903, Thomas Edison sought to enjoin the Edison Polyform Manufacturing Company from using his picture on bottles of a pain reliever that Edison himself had
invented earlier in his career. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 392 (N.J. Ch.
1907). The court granted the injunction. Id. at 395. Similarly, Jacqueline Onassis sued a
clothing company for the use of a lookalike in an advertisement because “she has never permitted her name or picture to be used in connection with the promotion of commercial products. Her name has been used sparingly only in connection with certain public services, civic,
art and educational projects which she has supported.” Onassis v. Christian Dior—New York,
Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
395
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an impingement on the victim’s freedom in the authorship of her selfnarrative, not merely her loss of profits. Prosser, however, used the term
“appropriation,” which is a word that pertains to property. Perhaps a better
word to describe the harm is “exploitation.” I continue to use the word appropriation, however, because it has become so commonly known in relation to this kind of harmful activity.
7. Distortion
Defamation law has existed for centuries. Consisting of the torts of libel and slander, defamation law protects against falsehoods that injure a
person’s reputation. In order to be liable for defamation, one must make “a
false and defamatory statement concerning another.”396 A “defamatory”
statement “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him.”397 False light, a more recent tort inspired by the Warren
and Brandeis article,398 protects against giving “publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” that is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”399 It safeguards “the interest of
the individual in not being made to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise than as he
is.”400 False light is categorized as one of Prosser’s four “privacy” torts.401
In addition to false light and defamation, a number of privacy statutes
ensure accuracy in record systems. The Privacy Act, for example, enables a
person to access and correct her records maintained by government agencies.402 Likewise, the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides recourse for a person who wants to correct her credit records,403 and the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act enables students to review and ensure the accuracy
of their school records.404 Additionally, longstanding privacy principles,
396

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (1977).
Id. § 559.
398
See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light
Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 885 (1991) (noting that the Warren and
Brandeis article led to decisions which Prosser later labeled as the false light tort).
399
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Although there is a significant amount
of overlap between the two torts, false light has a more expansive view of the harm caused by
distortion. While defamation requires the proof of reputational harm, false light does not, and
plaintiffs can be compensated solely for emotional distress. Schwartz, supra note 398, at 887.
400
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b.
401
Prosser, supra note 20, at 389.
402
5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000).
403
15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2000).
404
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2) (2000).
397
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such as the Code of Fair Information Practice405 and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Privacy Guidelines, contain provisions for ensuring the accuracy of records.406 The European Union Data Protection Directive contains a similar provision.407
Why are these harms of inaccuracy understood as privacy injuries?
Why does the law protect against these harms? Why should people have a
right to be judged accurately?
I refer to these harms as “distortion.” Distortion is the manipulation of
the way a person is perceived and judged by others, and involves the victim
being inaccurately exposed to the public. I include distortion in the taxonomy of privacy because of its significant similarity to other privacy disruptions. Distortion, like disclosure, involves the spreading of information that
affects the way society views a person. Both distortion and disclosure can
result in embarrassment, humiliation, stigma, and reputational harm. They
both involve the ability to control information about oneself and to have
some limited dominion over the way one is viewed by society. Distortion
differs from disclosure, however, because with distortion, the information
revealed is false and misleading.
Throughout most of western history, one’s reputation and character
have been viewed as indispensable to self-identity and the ability to engage
in public life. For centuries, the loss of social regard has had deleterious effects on one’s wealth, prosperity, and employment.408 Social regard, acceptance, and honor are extremely valuable, and they have power over us because they are integral to how we relate to others. Robert Post observes that
defamation law also exists for
the protection of an individual’s interest in dignity, which is to say his interest
in being included within the forms of social respect; and the enforcement of

405

See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, supra note 168, at xx-xxiii (listing
and discussing “safeguard requirements” and recommendations for automated personal data
systems).
406
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION
OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980). For more background
on the OECD Guidelines, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 773-81 (1999).
407
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 46, art. 6.
408
Arlette Farge, The Honor and Secrecy of Families, in 3 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE
571, 585 (Roger Chartier ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989). Heinrich Böll’s novella, The
Lost Honor of Katharina Blum, is a remarkable account of the harm of distortion. See
HEINRICH BÖLL, THE LOST HONOR OF KATHARINA BLUM (Leila Vennewitz trans., 1975)
(featuring a character whose life is ruined due to the publication of misleading information).
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society’s interest in its rules of civility, which is to say its interest in defining
409
and maintaining the contours of its own social constitution.

Reputation is not merely an individual creation. Although it is true that
people work very hard to build their reputations, one’s reputation is the
product of the judgment of other people in society. Reputation is a currency
through which we interact with each other. Protection against distortion
structures our interactions because it protects this currency. Distortion not
only affects the aggrieved individual; it also affects the society that judges
that individual: it interferes with our relationships to that individual, and it
inhibits our ability to assess the character of those that we deal with. We are
thus deceived in our relationships with others; these relationships are tainted
by false information that prevents us from making sound and fair judgments. Distortion’s direct impact is felt by the aggrieved individual, but it
has effects for all of society. We want to avoid arbitrary and undeserved
disruption of social relations.
The enigmatic and devious Iago’s comments in William Shakespeare’s
Othello capture the importance of reputation:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse steals trash: ’tis something, nothing;
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands.
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
410
And makes me poor indeed.

Using the power of reputation, Iago orchestrates a series of distortions to
make Othello believe that his wife, Desdemona, is having an affair with his
lieutenant, Cassio. These distortions induce Othello into a murderous rage,
during which he suffocates his wife. Othello illustrates the profound destructiveness of distortion, which tears apart relationships, dissolves trust,
and instigates violence.
D. Invasion
The final grouping of privacy harms I label as “invasion.” Invasion
harms differ from the harms of information collection, networking, and dissemination because they do not always involve information. I discuss two
types of invasion: (1) intrusion, and (2) decisional interference.
409

Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 711 (1986).
410
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3,
sc. 3, ll. 158-64 (Edward Pechter ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2004) (1623).
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1. Intrusion
For hundreds of years, the law has strongly guarded the privacy of the
home.411 According to William Blackstone, “the law . . . has so particular
and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle.”412 The law protects the home from trespass by others as well as from
nuisances.413 As Thomas Cooley observed in his famous treatise on constitutional law in 1868, “it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his
trunks broken open, his private books, papers, and letters exposed to prying
curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons.”414 The Fourth Amendment protects the home, as well as one’s body
and baggage, from searches by government officials.415 One of the torts inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s article is intrusion upon seclusion, which
creates a cause of action when one intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns” if the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”416 Why is it important to protect a safe
zone, a private realm free from intrusions?
Understood broadly, these actions are all forms of “intrusion.” Intrusion involves invasions or incursions into one’s life. It disturbs the victim’s
daily activities, alters her routines, destroys her solitude, and often makes
her feel uncomfortable and uneasy. Protection against intrusion involves
protecting the individual from unwanted social invasions, affording people
what Warren and Brandeis called “the right to be let alone.”417
Intrusion is related to disclosure, as disclosure is often made possible by
intrusive information gathering activities. Intrusion into one’s private
sphere can be caused not only by physical incursion and proximity but also
411

The notion that the home was one’s “castle” was articulated as early as 1499. See
Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894
(1981) (dating the first mention to a report written in 1499); see also Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605) (“[T]he house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress.”).
412
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223.
413
Nuisance involves “an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). William Blackstone defined private nuisance as “any thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216.
414
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306 (1868).
415
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
416
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
417
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 193.
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by gazes (surveillance) or questioning (interrogation). Intrusion has a certain resemblance to surveillance, in that being stared at for extended periods
of time can be quite invasive and penetrating and also disturbing, frightening, and disruptive. Intrusion is also related to interrogation, as people can
experience interrogation as a kind of intrusion into their affairs.
The harm caused by intrusion, however, differs from that caused by
other types of disruption because intrusion interrupts one’s activities
through the unwanted presence or activities of another person. The case of
Galella v. Onassis provides a good illustration of how intrusion is related
yet distinct from forms of information gathering.418 Galella, a paparazzo,
routinely harassed Jacqueline Onassis and her children with the late President John F. Kennedy, John and Caroline. To capture pictures, Galella
jumped into John’s path as he was riding his bike, interrupted Caroline’s
tennis, and, in the words of the trial judge, “insinuated himself into the very
fabric of Mrs. Onassis’ life.”419 Galella’s activities involved monitoring,
akin to surveillance, yet they were also physically intrusive.
Intrusion need not involve spatial incursions: spam, junk mail, junk
faxes, and telemarketing are disruptive in a similar way, as they sap people’s time and attention and interrupt their activities. While many forms of
intrusion are motivated by a desire to gather information or result in the
revelation of information, intrusion can cause harm even if no information is
involved. In particular, intrusion often interferes with solitude, the state of
being alone or able to retreat from the presence of others. Indeed, Warren
and Brandeis wrote from a tradition of solitude inspired by Ralph Waldo
Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and Emily Dickinson.420
For centuries, however, solitude has been criticized as self-indulgent.421
As Aristotle observed: “Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely
happy man a solitary; for no one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is

418
419
420

487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 994 (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 25

(1979).
421

See, e.g., JANETTE DILLON, SHAKESPEARE AND THE SOLITARY MAN 3-13 (1981)
(discussing approaches to solitude before Shakespeare’s time, which viewed a solitary life as
running counter to the good of the community). Solitude, which became a coveted aspect of
existence by the end of the seventeenth century, was viewed by many as dangerous and undesireable during the Middle Ages. See Michel Rouche, Private Life Conquers State and Society, in 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 408, at 419, 434-35 (describing the concern
a ninth-century abbot had for the hermit’s solitary life).
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to live with others.”422 Under this view, solitude is a form of retreat from
solidarity, a condition of being isolated and self-interested in which a person
can escape her social responsibilities.423 Too much of such freedom from
intrusion can lead to a scattered community, where people distance themselves into isolated enclaves.424 Why do we want to allow people to have a
realm in which they can avoid the presence of others in society?
The protection of a realm of solitude does not merely benefit the individual; it is built into society’s structure for a social purpose. Hannah Arendt notes that while the Greeks viewed the public sphere as having paramount importance, the private sphere was essential to shaping the
dimensions and quality of life in the public sphere:
A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would
say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into
sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its
425
depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.

In other words, solitude does not detract from a rich public life, but in fact
enhances it. Solitude enables people to rest from the pressures of living in
public and performing public roles.426 Too much envelopment in society
can be destructive to social relationships. For Thoreau, solitude fosters better social relationships because “we live thick and are in each other’s way,
and stumble over one another, and I think that we thus lose some respect for
one another.”427 Without refuge from others, relationships can become
more bitter and tense. Moreover, a space apart from others has enabled
people to develop artistic, political, and religious ideas that have had lasting
influence and value when later introduced into the public sphere.428

422

ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA § 1169b, ll. 18-19 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (n.d.).
423
See Michael A. Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life, in NOMOS, supra
note 71, at 88, 91-93 (discussing critiques of solitude).
424
See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 512-13 (1961) (demonstrating how
technological improvements have led to increased isolation).
425
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958).
426
According to philosopher Philip Koch, solitude “gives respite and restoration, a time
and a place to lick the wounds of social strife.” PHILIP KOCH, SOLITUDE 5 (1994); see also
WESTIN, supra note 19, at 35 (“[N]o individual can play indefinitely, without relief, the variety of roles that life demands. . . . Privacy in this aspect gives individuals, from factory workers to Presidents, a chance to lay their masks aside for rest. To be always ‘on’ would destroy
the human organism.”).
427
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Walden, in WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS 113 (Barnes
& Noble Books 1993) (1854).
428
Many social, political, and religious leaders began their influential public work with
preparations performed in private. See, e.g., JOSEPH BENSMAN & ROBERT LILIENFELD, BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: THE LOST BOUNDARIES OF THE SELF 37 (1979) (describing
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Generally, courts recognize intrusion upon seclusion tort actions only
when a person is at home or in a secluded place.429 This approach is akin to
courts recognizing a harm in surveillance only when conducted in private,
not in public.430 However, beyond solitude, people often expect space from
others—even when they are with other people. According to sociologist Irwin Altman, we need “personal space,” a kind of zone or aura around us to
separate ourselves from others.431 Spatial distance provides for “comfort,
ease, and relaxation.”432 Animals maintain “remarkably constant” distances
from other animals of the same species.433 In one series of studies, people
placed themselves very close to others, sparking strong reactions of hostility
and unease; the intruded-upon subjects quickly reestablished appropriate
spatial boundaries.434 As Robert Post observes, the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion upholds rules of civility and social respect.435 We each have certain “territories of the self,” and norms of civility require that we respect
others’ territories.436 We can, however, “invite intimacy by waiving our
claims to a territory and allowing others to draw close.”437
Some courts are beginning to recognize realms of exclusion where people can shut others out, even in public.438 Realms of exclusion are not

how a “religious hero[’s]” retreat to privacy would inspire followers on his return to the public
life); Richard H. Weisberg, It’s a Positivist, It’s a Pragmatist, It’s a Codifier! Reflections on
Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 92 (1996) (noting that, for Nietzsche, “[t]he
great legislator is himself (or herself) conceived of as one whose act of social codification begins with a private program of creative self-fulfillment”). As sixteenth-century French essayist Michel de Montaigne contended, solitude—even for public figures—is not self-indulgent,
for “[t]hey have only stepped back to make a better jump, to get a stronger impetus wherewith
to plunge deeper into the crowd.” MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Solitude, in THE COMPLETE
ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 174, 182 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958).
429
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“The defendant
is subject to liability . . . only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”).
430
See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
431
IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 52-54 (Irvington 1981) (1975).
432
Id. at 96.
433
Id. at 52.
434
Id. at 87-89.
435
Post, supra note 44, at 966-68.
436
Id. at 971-73 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN
PUBLIC 28 (1971)).
437
Id. at 973.
438
See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that a car accident victim had a privacy interest in her conversation with medical rescuers at
the accident scene); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687-88
(Iowa 1987) (holding that broadcasting video of the plaintiff eating at a restaurant might have
violated her privacy interest and noting that “the mere fact a person can be seen by others does
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realms of seclusion; they are structures for personal space that allow us to
interact with others without the interference of the rest of society. Communication and association with others often require freedom from intrusion.
For example, when we talk to a friend in a restaurant or another public
place, we still need space from other people in order to converse freely. In
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies, an undercover reporter accepted work as a “telepsychic” and surreptitiously videotaped conversations
she had at work with her coworkers, including Sanders.439 Even though
Sanders worked in a cubicle where he could readily be seen and overheard
by other employees, the court concluded that he had a viable privacy interest: “[T]he concept of ‘seclusion’ is relative. The mere fact that a person
can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.”440
2. Decisional Interference
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution prohibited the government from banning the use of contraceptives by married couples.441 Although the word “privacy” is not explicitly
mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, the Court reasoned that the Constitution provides for a “right to privacy” in the “penumbras” of many of the
amendments in the Bill of Rights.442 The Court noted that “[v]arious guarantees [by the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”443
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the reasoning in Griswold to
the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons as well.444 The Court explained that privacy “is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”445
Subsequently, the Court held in Roe v. Wade that the right to privacy “encompass[es] a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”446

not mean that person cannot legally be ‘secluded’”(quoting Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632
F. Supp. 1282, 1287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1986))).
439
978 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Cal. 1999).
440
Id. at 72 (quoting 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5.10[A][2]).
441
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
442
Id. at 484.
443
Id.
444
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
445
Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
446
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Baird all protect against what I call “decisional interference”—that is, governmental interference with people’s decisions regarding certain matters of their lives. These cases extend to decisions relating to sex and sexuality, while others extend to decisions
concerning the upbringing of one’s children.447 Many commentators have
argued that the language of privacy is inappropriate for decisional interference cases, since they primarily concern a harm to autonomy and liberty,
not to privacy. Thus, Laurence Tribe argues that the central issue in Roe v.
Wade is “not privacy, but autonomy.”448 Similarly, Louis Henkin contends
that the Supreme Court’s substantive due process right-to-privacy cases are
about protecting a “zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to governmental regulation,” not about protecting privacy.449 What relationship does
decisional interference have with the other forms of privacy in the taxonomy?
The decisional interference cases are deeply connected to information
privacy.450 In particular, just a few years after Roe v. Wade, the Court explained in Whalen v. Roe that the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” extends not only to the “interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions” but also to the “individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.”451 This gave rise to the constitutional right
to information privacy, which, although not developed further by the Supreme Court, has been recognized by most federal circuit courts.452 Whalen
447

See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating an
Oregon law requiring parents to send their children to public school, because it “unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control”).
448
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1352 (2d ed. 1988).
449
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410-11 (1974).
450
Thanks to Neil Richards for pointing this out.
451
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
452
See, e.g., In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We agree . . . that the
indiscriminate public disclosure of [certain personal information] may implicate the constitutional right to informational privacy.”); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th
Cir. 1990) (“Personal, private information in which an individual has a reasonable expectation
of confidentiality is protected by one’s constitutional right to privacy.”); Kimberlin v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Whether or not Kimberlin has a privacy
interest in the information . . . depends upon whether he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“Most courts considering the question . . .appear to agree that privacy of personal matters is a
[constitutionally] protected interest . . . .”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir.
1981) (“Our opinion does not mean . . . there is no constitutional right to non-disclosure of
private information.”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir.
1980) (recognizing that Whalen protects “the right not to have an individual’s private affairs
made public by the government”); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“There is another strand to the right to privacy properly called the right to confidentiality.”).
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involved a challenge to a requirement that physicians report to the state the
names and addresses of patients who received prescriptions for certain
classes of drugs. The Whalen Court linked decisional interference with disclosure by suggesting that “[t]he mere existence in readily available form of
the information about patients’ use of [the] drugs creates a genuine concern
that the information will become publicly known and that it will adversely
affect their reputations. This concern makes some patients reluctant to use
[the drugs] . . . .”453 By creating a risk of disclosure, the statute inhibited
patients’ decisions regarding their healthcare.454 The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s challenge because the state provided adequate protection against the “unwarranted disclosure” of the patient information.455
Thus, Whalen illustrates how decisional interference relates to disclosure.
Whalen also shows how decisional interference bears similarities to increased accessibility, since the existence of information in a government database can increase the potential accessibility of that information.
Decisional interference also resembles insecurity, secondary use, and
exclusion, in that all three of these information-processing harms can have a
chilling effect on a person’s decisions regarding her health and body.
Decisional interference and exposure have been judicially recognized to
affect the same aspects of the self—health, the body, sex, and so on. The
decisional interference cases track traditional areas that are widely considered to be private, such as the home, family, and body. Decisional interference, therefore, does not apply to all decisions, but only to a subset of decisions; this aspect of decisional interference resembles exposure in its focus
on those aspects of life which are socially considered to be the most private.
Decisional interference bears a similarity to the harm of intrusion as
both involve invasions into realms where we believe people should be free
from the incursions of others. Whereas intrusion involves the unwanted
general incursion of another’s presence or activities, decisional interference
involves unwanted incursion by the government into an individual’s decisions about her personal life. The resemblance is demonstrated by examining the first in the Court’s line of right-to-privacy cases, its 1891 decision in
Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.456 There, the Court held that a female plaintiff in a civil action could not be forced to submit to a surgical examination: “To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the
body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is

453
454
455
456

Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
Id.
Id. at 600-02.
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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an indignity, an assault, and a trespass. . . .”457 The Court emphasized the
importance of what Judge Cooley had termed the right “to be let alone”
which Warren and Brandeis used in their article one year earlier.458 While
the intrusion at issue in Botsford clearly implicated the harms of intrusion
and exposure, it also resembled decisional interference. The Court captured
this parallel in stating that the right “to be let alone” was “carefully guarded
by the common law” and consisted of “the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”459
Another case illustrating the connection between decisional interference
and intrusion is Stanley v. Georgia, which involved a challenge to an obscenity statute that punished the private possession of obscene material.460
Stanley was cited as support for the constitutional right to privacy in Roe v.
Wade461 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.462 Although the material in Stanley was
obscene and could properly be banned under the First Amendment, the
Court concluded that “the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas . . . regardless of their social worth.”463 The Court noted that
this “right takes on an added dimension” in a “prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home.”464
It is a fundamental right “to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”465 The Court
quoted Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States,466 a Fourth
Amendment wiretapping case, in which Brandeis argued that the “makers of
our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.”467
It is particularly interesting that the Court invoked “the right to be let
alone,” which was Warren and Brandeis’s principle justifying the privacy
torts.468 The criminalization of the private possession of obscene material,

457

Id. at 252.
Id. at 251; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195.
459
Union Pacific, 141 U.S. at 251.
460
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
461
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
462
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
463
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
464
Id.
465
Id.
466
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
467
Stanley, 395 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
468
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195.
458
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the Court’s reasoning suggests, necessitates governmental intrusion into
one’s home. The Court noted that people have “the right to be free from
state inquiry into the contents of [their] library.”469 Linking decisional interference with intrusion, it stressed that “a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he
may watch.”470 Further capturing the relationship between the two categories, Robert Post contends that the intrusion tort protects “territories of the
self,” which are critical to remaining “an independent and autonomous person.”471
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court further demonstrated the frequent overlap between decisional interference and intrusion in striking down a law that
prohibited consensual homosexual sodomy.472 The Court reasoned that
“adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”473 The statute was unconstitutional because of “its [unjustified] intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”474 Moreover,
the Court stated:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent
in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside
the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom ex475
tends beyond spatial bounds.

The Court thus linked decisional interference to intrusion.
Decisional interference also bears an indirect resemblance to blackmail,
in that laws restricting consensual private sexual behavior often give rise to
blackmail. The Lawrence Court noted that in 1955, when crafting the
Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute recommended against
criminalizing “consensual sexual relations conducted in private”476 in part
because “the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others,” and
because “the laws were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of
blackmail.”477 Indeed, as Angus McLaren recounts, blackmail historically
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occurred in the shadow of laws that punished consensual sexual activities in
private.478 McLaren writes: “Society preferred to blame the eruption of
blackmail on certain ‘dangerous’ women and men rather than come to terms
with the tension between the laws and the sexual practices that often provided temptation to unscrupulous individuals.”479
CONCLUSION
In 1960, William Prosser identified just four interests under the rubric
of privacy, and focused exclusively on tort law. His effort is far too narrow
and far too out-of-date to serve as an effective guide to the privacy problems
we face today. In this Article, I have attempted to provide a clearer and
more robust account of privacy—one that provides us with a framework for
understanding privacy problems. The taxonomy demonstrates that privacy
disruptions are different from one another and yet share important similarities. The taxonomy enables us to see privacy in a more multidimensional
way.480
Although all of the privacy harms I identify in the taxonomy are related
in some way, they are not all related in the same way—there is no common
denominator that links them all. Privacy violations are a group of related
harms, each of which has received at least some recognition in the law. But
our understanding of privacy remains in a fog, and the law remains fragmented and inconsistent.
Too many courts and policymakers struggle with even identifying the
presence of a privacy problem. Protecting privacy requires careful balancing, as neither privacy nor its countervailing interests are absolute values.
Unfortunately, due to conceptual confusion, courts and legislatures often
fail to recognize privacy problems, and thus no balancing ever takes place.
This does not mean that privacy should always win in the balance, but it
should not be dismissed just because it is ignored or misconstrued.
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When translated into the legal system, privacy is a form of protection
against certain harmful or problematic activities. The activities that affect
privacy are not necessarily socially undesirable or worthy of sanction or
prohibition. This fact is what makes addressing privacy issues so complex.
In many instances, there is no clear-cut wrongdoer, no indisputable villain
whose activities lack social value. Instead, many privacy problems emerge
as a result of efficacious activities, much like pollution is an outgrowth of
industrial production. With the taxonomy, I have attempted to demonstrate
that these activities are not without cost, that they have certain nontrivial effects on people’s lives and well-being.
Courts and policymakers often have great difficulty in arriving at a coherent assessment of the various privacy problems and harms that they must
address. One common pitfall is viewing “privacy” as a particular kind of
harm to the exclusion of all others. As illustrated throughout this Article,
courts generally find no privacy interest if information is in the public domain, if people are monitored in public, if information is gathered in a public place, if no intimate or embarrassing details are revealed, or if no new
data is collected about a person. If courts and legislatures focused instead
on the privacy problems, many of these distinctions and determinative factors would matter much less in the analysis. Thus, when analyzing surveillance issues, courts focus on whether the surveillance occurs in public or in
private, even though problems and harms can emerge in all settings. Aggregation creates problems even when all of the data is already available in
the public domain. The same is true of increased accessibility. For disclosure, the secrecy of the information becomes a central dispositive factor;
this approach often misses the crux of the disclosure harm, which is not the
revelation of total secrets, but the spreading of information beyond expected
boundaries. In intrusion analyses, courts often fail to recognize harm when
people are intruded upon in public places, yet the nature of the harm is not
limited solely to private places.
At other times, the privacy problem at issue is misconstrued. For example, identification is often understood as a harm created by revealing
one’s name, but the essence of the problem is being linked to a stream of
data, not only a name. Insecurity is often not adequately addressed by the
law because a materialized harm has not yet occurred. But insecurity remains a problem, even where there has been no actual disclosure or leakage
of embarrassing details. Appropriation is understood primarily as a harm to
property interests, and its dignitary dimensions are thus frequently ignored
by courts. Further complicating matters is the fact that privacy problems are
inconsistently recognized across different areas of the law. For example,
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tort law readily recognizes and redresses breach of confidentiality, yet
Fourth Amendment law ignores it as a harm.
Courts and legislatures respond well to more traditional privacy problems, such as intrusions that are physical in nature, disclosures of deep secrets, or distortion. This is due, in part, to the fact that these problems track
traditional conceptions of privacy. In the secrecy paradigm, a privacy violation is understood as the uncovering of a person’s hidden world. Physical
intrusions are problems that even people in ancient times could experience
and understand. But some of the privacy problems we face today are different in nature, and do not track traditional conceptions of privacy. They involve efforts to gain knowledge about an individual without physically intruding or even gathering data directly from them (aggregation), or
problems that emerge from the way that the data is handled and maintained
(insecurity), the way it is used (secondary use), and the inability of people to
participate in its processing (exclusion). Modern privacy problems emerge
not just from disclosing deep secrets, but from making obscure information
more accessible (increased accessibility) or from consistent observation or
eavesdropping (surveillance).
The taxonomy lays down a framework to understand the range of privacy problems, the similarities and differences among them, the relationships among them, and what it is that makes them problematic. By focusing
on activities, the taxonomy also seeks to emphasize how privacy problems
arise. Often, technology is involved in various privacy problems, as it facilitates the gathering, processing, and dissemination of information. Privacy problems, however, are caused not by technology alone, but primarily
through activities of people, businesses, and the government. The way to
address privacy problems is to regulate these activities.
With a framework for identifying and understanding privacy problems,
courts and policymakers can better balance privacy considerations against
countervailing interests. This Article is thus the beginning of what will
hopefully be a more comprehensive and coherent understanding of privacy.

